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ARTICLES 
REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY: A 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S 
TANGLED NONPROFIT LAW 
Thomas Kelley* 
It is as if I were sitting on the neck of a man, and, having quite 
crushed him down, I compel him to carry me, and will not alight 
from off his shoulders, while I assure myself and others that I am 
very sorry for him, and wish to ease his condition by every means in 
my power except by getting off his back.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Charitable2 organizations in the United States find themselves in a 
* Clinical Professor of Law and supervisor of the Community Development Law 
Clinic, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. A.B., Harvard 
1984, J.D., Northeastern 1991. Thanks to my colleagues Gail Agrawal, Melissa 
Jacoby, Gene Nichol, and Deborah Weissman for guidance and encouragement; to 
my research assistants Jeffery Berger, and Debra Eidson, for chasing down, among 
other things, obscure historical works; to Bill McCarthy, for providing me a 
comfortable space in which to think; and to the Council for International Exchange of 
Scholars, on whose time I wrote the final sections of this Article. 
1. Leo Tolstoy, What Is to be Done?, in The Complete Works of Lyof N. Tolstoi 
81 (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1984). 
2. The nomenclature of charity is variable and confusing. In its broadest sense, 
charity can be taken to mean giving help to those in need. See William Diaz, For 
Whom and For What? The Contributions of the Nonprofit Sector, in The State of 
Nonprofit America 517 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). A standard dictionary 
definition provides that charity is: 
1. the love of God for man or of man for his fellow men 2. an act of good will 
or affection 3. the feeling of good will; benevolence ... 5. a) voluntary giving 
of money or other help to those in need b) money or help so given c) an 
institution or other recipient of such help .... 
Webster's New World Dictionary (Second College ed. 1972). Used in this sense, 
charity is a general term that encompasses everything from an individual giving a 
quarter to a homeless person on the street to private foundations that fund complex 
social purpose enterprises. Some commentators distinguish charity from 
philanthropy, defining the former as person-to-person attempts to alleviate suffering 
and the latter as more ambitious efforts that devote private resources to systematic 
social problems, not necessarily those that affect only the poor. See, e.g., Maurice G. 
Gurin & Jon Van Ti!, Philanthropy in Its Historical Context, in Critical Issues in 
American Philanthropy: Strengthening Theory and Practice 3 (Jon Van Ti! et al. eds., 
1990) (calling philanthropy the "prudent sister" of charity" (internal quotation marks 
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double bind these days. On one hand, our free-market American 
culture expects them to be entrepreneurial and bottom line-oriented. 
Our government and the donor community tell them they must be 
lean and efficient, establish metrics to measure and ensure 
organizational outcomes, develop synergistic partnerships with for-
profit organizations, identify and exploit their comparative 
advantages, recruit leadership with vision and entrepreneurial zeal, 
market themselves effectively, articulate their "deliverables," and, 
often times, find ways to charge fees or otherwise generate earned 
income so that they can pay their own way.3 In short, they must retool 
to become more like successful commercial enterprises. On the other 
hand, courts and governmental agencies, the Internal Revenue 
Service ("IRS") in particular,4 tell charitable organizations that if they 
omitted)); see also Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 87 (7th 
ed. 1998). The Filer Commission of the 1970s, which was charged with studying 
philanthropy and charity in the United States, avoided using those terms because it 
feared they smacked of noblesse oblige. It preferred the term "private giving for 
public purposes." Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Pub. Needs, Giving in America: 
Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector 53 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
the realm of American law, the term "charity" is exasperatingly variable and 
confusing. In cases and statutes charity is sometimes used in the general dictionary 
sense, described above. See, e.g., Ould v. Wash. Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303,311 
(1877); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1930). It also is used to refer to 
the general category of nonprofit organizations that qualify for tax exemption under 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. This broad category includes 
organizations that "test for public safety" and "foster national or international 
amateur sports competition[s]." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see Hopkins, supra, at 85. 
Next, the word charity denotes a still-broad subcategory within section 501(c)(3) 
comprised of those organizations and activities that engage in 
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of 
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of 
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of 
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to 
accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood 
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human 
and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration 
and juvenile delinquency. 
Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). In spite of these broad uses 
of the term charity, it sometimes is used more narrowly in the law to mean "assistance 
to the poor, the indigent, the destitute." Hopkins, supra, at 86. This latter use 
sometimes is referred to as the "vulgar" meaning of charity. Id. Internal Revenue 
Service ("IRS") regulations do little to clarify the legal meaning of charity. 
Regulations accompanying section 501(c)(3) tell us only that the word "charity" is 
used by the IRS in its "generally accepted legal sense." Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-
l(d)(2). A good deal of this Article will be devoted to peeling back the layers of 
confusion over what we as a society and as a legal system mean by charity. For the 
sake of clarity, however, we shall begin with the assumption that the word "charity," 
when it appears in this Article, is used in its broadest sense-the first definition 
discussed in this now over-long footnote-unless otherwise indicated. 
3. See infra Parts 11.D.l-2; see also Dennis R. Young & Lester M. Salamon, 
Commercialization, Social Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, in The State of 
Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at 423. 
4. In theory, states' attorneys general or other specified state authorities are 
charged with regulating charitable organizations. In fact, few states devote significant 
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follow the path to the marketplace, they may pay the ultimate price: 
loss of federal tax exemption. Charities live in fear of being ensnared 
by confusing and contradictory legal doctrines such as the operational 
test, the commerciality doctrine, the unrelated business income tax 
("UBIT"), and the commensurate-in-scope doctrine, all designed, at 
least in part, to prevent them from looking and acting too 
commercial. 5 
Contemporary American charities might find some comfort in the 
knowledge that the problem is not of their making. The present fix 
they find themselves in has deep historical roots in the Anglo-
American legal tradition. For several hundred years, our culture has 
developed a vibrant charitable tradition without ever agreeing as a 
matter of culture or law on what "charity" means.6 In our tradition, 
and in our contemporary culture, charity is a compassionate act of 
aiding the poor, of distributing alms to the needy, and spooning soup 
to the hungry. At the same time, it is a tool for social engineering, for 
efficiently producing socially beneficial results that will lighten the 
burdens on our government. These are two very different conceptions 
of charity, but the legal doctrines that govern charity in the United 
States do not clearly distinguish between them. 
This Article will argue that the increasing confusion in the 
contemporary American law of charity stems from the fact that our 
society has moved and is continuing to move toward a results-
oriented, quasi-commercial, social engineer's conception of charity, 
while our law has continued to encourage, and often insist upon, a 
compassionate brand of "vulgar" charity. Part I of this Article will 
take us back to the origins of Anglo-American charity so that we can 
understand where the definitional split began and how Anglo-
American charity evolved to the point that vexes us today.7 It will 
then discuss how those early conceptions of charity were transplanted 
resources to monitoring the charitable nonprofit sector, and the IRS, working through 
the tax code, has become the de facto watchdog. See James J. Fishman, The 
Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 Emory 
L.J. 617,639 (1985). 
5. See infra Part 11.C. 
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Our confusion about the practical 
and legal definition of charity is remarkable when one considers that we in the United 
States like to view ourselves as a people committed to charity, philanthropy, and 
voluntary associations. See David Wagner, What's Love Got To Do With It? A 
Critical Look at American Charity, ix-x, 1-2 (2000). 
7. A wealth of scholarly material traces the roots of American charity and 
philanthropy back to the ancient Greeks and beyond. Many of these historical 
narratives pause for a significant examination of the Poor Laws of Elizabethan 
England, which most view as seminal to America's law of charity. See, e.g., Walter I. 
Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History Of Social Welfare in America 
(6th ed. 1999). For a British perspective, see Francis Gladstone, Charity, Law and 
Social Justice (1982). Though we will try not to belabor this oft-told history, we will 
review it thoroughly enough to understand the divergent trends that have led to the 
schizophrenic nature of American charity law. 
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to the United States, giving rise to our current legal confusion. Part II 
will focus on the law of charity in the United States, paying particular 
attention to four doctrines that are causing confusion and 
consternation for today's entrepreneurial charities because they are 
premised upon an unsettled cultural and legal definition of charity. 
This Article will not attempt to resolve the question of whether 
contemporary America's embrace of market-oriented, 
entrepreneurial charity is a positive or negative phenomenon. Nor 
will it provide a detailed policy prescription for getting us out of the 
mess we find ourselves in. However, Part III will offer a broad 
suggestion for adapting our laws to better fit our society's evolving 
conception of charity, and will put forward the simple conclusion that 
we as a society should not continue to do what we are doing. We 
should not force charities to embrace the marketplace and pay their 
own way, and at the same time leave in place legal doctrines that 
punish them for doing so. If we as a society are going to force 
charities and the people they serve to fend for themselves, then we 
have a moral, if not legal, obligation to get our legal system off their 
backs. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
CONCEPTION OF CHARITY 
A. Charity from Ancient Egypt to Elizabeth I 
1. Charity As Love 
According to the sociobiologist E.O. Wilson, "[g]enerosity without 
hope of reciprocatioq is the rarest and most cherished of human 
behaviors, subtle and difficult to define, ... surrounded by ritual and 
circumstance, and honored by medallions and emotional orations."8 
Because such altruistic behavior confers certain evolutionary 
advantages, it has become a selected and enduring trait in human 
beings.9 Recently published research on the human brain seems to 
confirm that humans are wired to cooperate. 10 
Historians trace the concept of charity to civilizations that existed 
long before the birth of Christ. As early as 1300 B.C., ancient 
Egyptian civilization included the concept of "Maat," which implied 
social justice and righteous dealings with one's fellow man. 11 
Egyptians were buried with records of the "blessed giving[s]" they had 
8. Edward 0. Wilson, On Human Nature 155 (1978). 
9. See id. at 159. 
10. See Natalie Angier, Why We're So Nice: We're Wired to Cooperate, N.Y. 
Times, July 23, 2002, at Fl ( describing research in which MRI technology shows that 
selfless acts of cooperation stimulate important pleasure centers in the brain). 
11. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 10. 
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shared with the poor during their lifetimes. 12 "In Early Mesopotamia, 
the Code of Hammurabi instructed Babylonians to protect the less 
fortunate and to care for the poor, widowed and orphaned."13 
Buddhism, founded in 400 B.C., taught that love and charity were 
paramount virtues. 14 In Hindu scriptures, giving to the needy-
particularly holy men dependent on alms-was a duty and could 
reward the donor in a future existence.15 
The Anglo-American tradition of charity has Ancient Hebrew 
roots. Hebrew doctrine taught that providing for the needy was an 
essential part of a just society, and that not only did humans have a 
moral obligation to aid those in need, but those in need had a moral 
obligation to accept assistance. 16 Judaism made tithing compulsory, 
along with giving bread to the hungry, taking outcasts into the home, 
and clothing the naked.17 Early Judaism stressed that a principal 
function of the synagogue was to organize charitable giving.18 The 
Jewish notion of charity was bound up closely with the idea of love,19 
and a fundamental principal of the Torah is the command to love thy 
neighbor as thyself.20 
Judaism was seminal to the early Christian concept of charity,21 and 
it was through Christianity that the concept of charity became 
cemented in Anglo-American culture and law.22 As Christianity 
12. Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601-2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
731, 732 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13. Id.; see Trattner, supra note 7, at 1; Stephen R. Block, A History of the 
Discipline, in The Nonprofit Organization: Essential Readings 46 (David L. Gies et. 
al. eds., 1990). 
14. Trattner, supra note 7, at 1. 
15. Merle Curti, Philanthropy, in The Nonprofit Organization: Essential 
Readings, supra note 13, at 339. 
16. Trattner, supra note 7, at 2; Curti, supra note 15, at 340; see Robert L. Payton, 
A Tradition in Jeopardy, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing 
America 482 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999) (indicating that the 
oldest books of the Old Testament include mandates to aid widows, orphans, 
strangers, and the poor). 
17. Curti, supra note 15, at 340 ( citing Isiah 58:7). 
18. Id. at 340-41. 
19. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 9, 15. The word charity derives from the Latin 
caritas, itself a translation of the Greek agape. Agape was the word chosen around 
200 B.C. by the first translators of the Old Testament to represent the Hebrew hab, or 
love. Many stories of the Old Testament illustrate the importance of love and mercy. 
20. Id. at 18 (noting that the Jewish conception of charity is bound up with the 
notion of combating injustice). 
21. Curti, supra note 15, at 341. 
22. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 20. I do not mean to argue that Anglo-
American charity is an exclusively Christian phenomenon. In his important work on 
American philanthropy, Robert Bremner offers the droll observation that the first 
philanthropists in the New World were the Native Americans who aided the 
struggling Pilgrims. Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy 5 (1960). Islam has 
also influenced this country's culture since before its founding, not least through the 
spiritual convictions of the Muslim men and women from Africa who were taken to 
this continent against their will. Anyone interested in the future of charity in this 
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spread rapidly across the Roman Empire in its waning days, the 
"'practical application of charity was probably the most potent single 
cause of Christian success."'23 The Roman Emperor Constantine 
converted to Christianity around 311 A.O. and he supported the 
church's practical charitable work by assigning a fixed and generous 
proportion of provincial revenues to church charity.24 
Early Christianity had a very particular view of its meaning. Jesus 
taught that love, mercy, and justice should be written on people's 
hearts, even if not necessarily in their laws.25 His followers were 
obliged to love their enemies, practice good deeds, offer alms 
generously, and thereby gain entrance into heaven.26 In the early 
Christian view, the giving of alms was a spiritual rather than a social 
act, one that could bring the donor closer to a union with God.27 The 
effect of charitable acts on the giver's soul was doctrinally more 
significant than the effects on the body of the recipient.28 If Christians 
in those days had any thoughts about eliminating the underlying 
causes of poverty, they probably would have opposed the notion, for if 
there were no poor, there would be no means by which the fortunate 
could buy divine grace.29 By the fourth century, the concept of charity 
was well established in Christendom, but it had little to do with 
preventing poverty; it was about almsgiving in the face of perpetual 
and unavoidable need.30 
It is significant for our purposes that the early Christian tradition 
assumed that poverty and need arose as part of God's plan for 
mortals, and that it was just and proper for individuals within society 
to assume responsibility for the attendant suffering.31 Individuals 
were afflicted by poverty as a result of God's plan, not because they 
necessarily deserved to suffer. It followed that poverty and begging of 
alms could not be moral failings, and by no means could they be 
considered crimes.32 Followers were obliged to identify and address 
country should take into account Islam's growing influence within our borders. Like 
Judaism and Christianity, Islam places strong emphasis on giving to the poor and 
powerless, and almsgiving is one of its five pillars. See Approaching the Qur'ran: The 
Early Revelations 38 (Michael Sells trans., 1999). 
23. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 27 (quoting H. Chadwick, The Early Church 56 
(1967)). 
24. See id. 
25. Id. at 22. 
26. Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Pub. Needs, supra note 2, at 62 (referring 
to this doctrine as "salvation at a price"); Wagner, supra note 6, at 82 (stating that in 
early Christian doctrine, an "alms giver could become 'God's creditor'"). 
27. Curti, supra note 15, at 341. 
28. B. Kirkman Gray, A History of English Philanthropy, vii (1905). 
29. Wagner, supra note 6, at 82. 
30. Id. See generally Curti, supra note 15. 
31. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 4. 
32. Id. 
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the needs of the poor without regard to their attractiveness or 
deservedness. 33 
After the fall of the Roman Empire, England and parts of Europe 
experienced a long period in which no state and no secular institution 
was equipped to provide relief for the poor and distressed. The 
Church of Rome became the primary front of charitable work in 
Europe and over time institutionalized its doctrine of love for fellow 
men by creating (and encouraging gifts for) monasteries, charitable 
hospitals, and colleges, all dedicated to serving God by providing for 
the poor.34 By the sixth century and throughout most of the early 
Middle Ages in England, Catholic monasteries were the centers of 
practical charity, relieving poverty, tending the sick, and providing 
education.35 
By the eleventh century, as feudalism became the dominant mode 
of social organization in England, landed nobles began to take on-at 
least in theory-responsibility for caring for their needy subjects in 
exchange for loyalty, agricultural labor, and a willingness to fight 
under the lord's banner in the period's endless private and public 
wars.36 In the following centuries, cities, towns, and guilds also began 
to take a role in poor relief.37 However, monasteries, with their 
Christian view of charity, remained the primary institutional vehicles 
for providing aid to the sick and poor from medieval times up until the 
Protestant Reformation. 
2. The Origins of English Charity Laws 
The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in England were a time of 
transition in the law and culture of charity. Although most organized 
charity still took place under the aegis of the Church of Rome and its 
monasteries, budding medieval states began to intervene through the 
institution of the law. England's early legislative efforts were 
intended solely to control begging and prevent vagrancy, problems 
that were only beginning to appear on a significant scale.38 A typical 
effort was the Ordinance of Laborers in 1349, which attempted among 
other things to force both laborers and the unemployed poor to 
remain within their home districts and to work for whoever would hire 
33. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 30. 
34. See Curti, supra note 15, at 342-43 (adding that during this time much of the 
charity was "impulsive, indiscriminate, and perfunctory"). 
35. E.M. Leonard, The Early History of English Poor Relief 4 (2d ed. 1965); 
Trattner, supra note 7, at 4; see Wagner, supra note 6, at 85 (adding that medieval 
monasteries were centers of radical thought and often at odds with the mother 
church). 
36. Trattner, supra note 7, at 4. See generally Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred 
Years War: Trial by Battle (1990). 
37. Leonard, supra note 35, at 7. 
38. Id. at 3. 
2444 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
them.39 It also limited private giving on the theory that so-called 
"promiscuous alms" would encourage sloth and licentiousness.40 
These restrictions were further elaborated in the Act of 1388, which 
not only forbade the movement of beggars and laborers but went a 
step further by requiring all commoners to obtain letters of permission 
before leaving their local districts.41 Those caught without letters were 
to be placed in stocks, which seems a harsh punishment until 
compared to the abuse doled out to the English poor in the following 
centuries.42 
Crude as they were, these early English acts contained seeds of 
future Anglo-American laws governing charity. They represented the 
first attempts to weed out able-bodied or "sturdy" beggars, who were 
considered unworthy of charity.43 They also were harbingers of the 
growing belief that poverty was a personal failing that could justly be 
remedied by controlling and punishing the poor.44 
As English authorities undertook these simple attempts to legislate 
against poverty and its effects, society's definition of charity began to 
shift. Where it had once meant ecclesiastical attempts to purify men's 
hearts by ministering to the needs of the poor, it now began to imply a 
sort of social engineering. For the first time, it appeared that the 
emerging nation-state might have a legitimate role in controlling 
poverty and, at least indirectly, administering charity. Thus began a 
long, slow process-one that continues to this day-of tugging charity 
away from its ecclesiastical roots. 
3. Charity as Social Engineering 
Histories of Anglo-American charity and the laws that regulate it 
often begin in the year 1601 with the passage of Queen Elizabeth's 
Poor Laws and Statute of Charitable Uses.45 But those laws were in 
reality a mere reflection and culmination of gradual, fundamental 
changes in the cultural and legal definition of charity that took place 
during the sixteenth century in England.46 To pinpoint the origins of 
America's present legal difficulties, we must go back a bit further than 
1601, to the early and mid-1500s when two historic developments 
helped establish a new cultural and legal definition of charity. 
The first was King Henry VIIl's (r. 1509-1547) disagreement with 
the Church of Rome over his desire to divorce Catherine of Aragon 
39. Trattner, supra note 7, at 8. 
40. Leonard supra note 35, at 3; Trattner, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
41. Leonard, supra note 35, at 5. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses. 
46. See Gray, supra note 28, at 43; Trattner, supra note 7, at 10. 
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and marry Anne Boleyn. When the Church of Rome, in the person of 
Pope Clement VI, refused to grant Henry's annulment and bless his 
second marriage, Henry responded in 1536 by establishing his own 
more compliant church, the Church of England, and seizing all 
ecclesiastical property in his domains, including the thousands of 
monasteries that formerly had ministered to the poor.47 The 
recipients of Church of Rome properties, both ecclesiastical and lay, 
were generally bound by the terms of the Crown's grants to continue 
the charity work that had taken place on the property, but in practice 
these pledges were often ignored.48 
The second, coincidental historical trend that helped sow the seeds 
of modern charity was the shift from feudal social organization to 
mercantile capitalism.49 The mid-sixteenth century in England was a 
time of social and economic upheaval. To condense several centuries 
of gradual historical change into one paragraph, the wool production 
in Europe's Low Countries became a center of industrial 
development, and the feudal lords of England realized that they could 
create greater personal wealth by fencing, or "enclosing," their vast 
domains to create sheep pasturage rather than by maintaining leagues 
of peasants to cultivate the land and create agricultural surplus. The 
result of the so-called "enclosure movement" was to throw the 
peasants off of the land on which they subsisted, forcing many to 
migrate to urban centers where, not incidentally, mercantile industries 
were taking shape and looking for labor.so In the social dislocation 
caused by this economic transformation, many poor were left without 
land to grow crops or wages with which to buy food. Poverty and the 
social ills that attend it-vagrancy, begging, crime-skyrocketed and 
laws intended to manage or control poverty multiplied.s1 
Thus, in Henry VIII's England, poverty was increasing dramatically 
just as he was destroying the Catholic monasteries that acted as the 
nation's primary institutions of poor relief.s2 His Reformation swept 
47. David C. Hammack, Introduction to Making the Nonprofit Sector in the 
United States 3-4 (David C. Hammack ed., 1998) [hereinafter The Nonprofit Sector]. 
48. Gray, supra note 28, at 11. 
49. Samuel Mencher, Poor Law to Poverty Program: Economic Security Policy in 
Britain and the United States 3 (1967) (arguing that the origins of modem 
philanthropy are in the rise of mercantilism in the mid-sixteenth century); Curti, supra 
note 15, at 342 (arguing philanthropy grew from the death of feudalism, the rise of 
cities and a middle class, dislocation of population due to the enclosure movement, 
and the Reformation itself); see also Hammack, supra note 47, at 9. 
50. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 9. Most of those who found wage labor 
continued in poverty. It was an accepted tenet of the classical economic theory of the 
early mercantile period that wages be kept at subsistence levels, not (at least in 
theory) to maximize profits, but rather to prevent laborers from attempting to 
accumulate capital, thereby rising above their station and disrupting the hierarchical 
social system that God had ordained. 
51. See Leonard, supra note 35, at 11-13; see also Gray, supra note 28, at 3-6 ("The 
sheep farmers and enclosers acted promptly, the habits of a people alter but slowly."). 
52. See Gray, supra note 28, at 9. 
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away the church-centered welfare system, and attempted to fill the 
void with a more secular brand of philanthropy and state regulation.53 
Charity, which formerly had been grounded in the Roman Catholic 
values of love and compassion, mercy and forgiveness, now also would 
be controlled by the values of the s'tate and its state-sponsored 
religion.54 Given the economic trends the state was being forced to 
grapple with, its values were focused on creating social order, not 
alleviating suffering out of a sense of love and compassion and a 
desire to please the Lord.55 At the same time, the state-sponsored 
Protestantism that was taking hold in England placed greater 
emphasis than the Church of Rome on asceticism, self-reliance, the 
primacy of work, and the notion that poverty was a sign of God's 
disfavor.56 For charity and for the poor that relied on it, significant 
changes were in the offing. 
4. The Evolving Law of Charity 
England's intervention in the realm of charity took place gradually 
over more than two hundred years and included a long series of edicts 
and parliamentary acts. For the sake of brevity, we will condense that 
history into a few pages, focusing particular attention on those 
developments that laid the foundation for our current, divided 
American cultural and legal definition of charity. 
The first of Henry's acts that established the template for later 
charity law was a 1531 Act which was intended to address the growing 
problem of poverty.57 It commanded sheriffs and justices of the peace 
in the realm to identify the deserving poor in their districts and issue 
to them what amounted to licenses to beg within limited geographic 
limits. According to this Act, the able-bodied who sought alms were 
to be punished by whipping, and those who gave alms to the able-
bodied were to be fined.58 By its own terms, the Act was intended to 
limit the number of beggars, not to provide relief to the poor. 
The first act failed at both relieving poverty and controlling its 
consequences, and thus led to the second significant charity act of 
Henry's reign, which commanded his subjects to, among other things, 
put the "sturdy poor" to work and bind vagrant children into 
apprenticeships.59 As to those who were legitimately "impotent," a 
system was established by which alms were to be placed in a common 
box at each parish of the Church of England and then distributed by 
53. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 37-38. 
54. See id. at 38. 
55. See Gareth Jones, History of the Law Of Charity 1532-1827, at 10 (1969). 
56. Gurin & Van Ti!, supra note 2, at 5; see Mencher, supra note 49, at 6 (arguing 
that during the mercantile period work became man's duty before God). 
57. 22 Hen. 8, c. 12 (1531) (Eng.); see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
58. Leonard, supra note 35, at 54; see also Gray, supra note 28, at 32. 
59. 27 Hen. 7, c. 25 (1536) (Eng.); see also Leonard, supra note 35, at 54-56. 
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parish authorities to the truly needy.60 Again, private alms were 
forbidden for fear they would encourage idleness and vagrancy.61 This 
second act introduced into the Anglo-American law of charity the 
idea of putting the poor to work; however, it gave no guidance as to 
how that task was to be carried out, and for that reason was largely 
ineffectual. Still, when taken together, Henry's two acts represented 
the first time the state had taken a significant role in administering 
charity or poor relief:'62 and, more important for our purposes, it 
implanted the notion in the Anglo-American legal and cultural 
tradition that proving or requiring work was a valid response to 
poverty and suffering. 
If Henry's reign introduced the notion that the state should use a 
stick as the primary means of addressing poverty, the idea was 
stretched to extremes during the brief reign of Henry's son, Edward 
VI (r. 1547-1553). Finding that Henry's strictures had not stemmed 
the tide of poverty and begging, in 1547, the first year of young 
Edward's reign, an act was passed providing for, among other things, 
the enslavement of sturdy beggars for a term of two years.63 If the 
enslaved subjects ran away and were captured, they would be 
enslaved for life.64 The sons of vagrants could be removed from their 
parents and apprenticed until they reached the age of twenty-four, 
daughters until the age of twenty.65 The enslavement laws lasted for 
only two years, at which time whipping was reintroduced, but by that 
time it had been well established that the state's intervention in the 
realm of charity would be guided by principles other than 
compassionate benevolence.66 
As the problems of poverty and vagrancy grew and social stability 
was further threatened, legislative acts multiplied. During the reign of 
Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) the Act Concerning Poverty was horridly 
harsh in its efforts to suppress vagrancy.67 Penalties under the Act 
60. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 9. 
61. Leonard, supra note 35, at 55 (noting that noblemen, abbots, and friars were 
exempted from the limits on almsgiving). 
62. See id.; see also Mencher, supra note 49, at 26. 
63. Leonard, supra note 35, at 56-57 (citing 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547) (Eng.)). 
64. Id. at 56. 
65. Id. 
66. See id. at 56-57. 
67. 14 Eliz., c. 5 (1572) (Eng.); see also Leonard, supra note 35, at 70. Today, this 
Act is most often referred to because its efforts to define the problem of poverty are 
amusing to contemporary ears. For example, it famously included within its 
definition of vagrants "scholars of Oxford and Cambridge who beg without being 
licensed by Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor." Id. It was also notable for our purposes 
because of the controversy it caused by proscribing travel by "minstrels, bearwards, 
etc." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). After contentious debate, the House of 
Commons worked out a compromise that permitted this class to wander but only after 
obtaining a license from two separate justices of the peace. It was an early example of 
an Anglo-American legislative body having to choose between poverty regulation and 
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included whipping and boring through the ear for the first offense, 
conviction of a felony for the second offense, and, with certain 
exceptions, death for the third offense.68 
Elizabeth's Act of 1572 was also remarkable in that it represented a 
first attempt by the English government to establish a comprehensive 
system of poor relief. The law commanded justices of the peace to 
create registries of their districts' deserving poor and identify 
habitations that could accommodate them. They also were to weed 
out poor strangers and send them to their home districts. Once the 
list of legitimate local poor was completed, local officials were to 
estimate the expense of aiding them, and tax the district's inhabitants 
accordingly.69 By the time of this act, the state had clearly abandoned 
the notion that giving to the poor should be voluntary and for the 
metaphysical benefit of the donor. Charity had come over to the 
state, and now would be characterized by social engineering, 
compulsion, and work.70 
The Elizabethan laws that followed represented elaborations on the 
general theme of forcing work upon the poor. The Act of 157571 
offered a first, tentative solution to the problem of providing work for 
the "sturdy poor" rather than simply whipping, jailing, or enslaving 
them. It required each city and town to provide a stack of wool, 
hemp, iron, or other raw material for labor for the idle. It also 
required the establishment of houses of correction where those 
unwilling to work could be sent.72 
Such was the state of English law when the Statute of Charitable 
Uses and the Poor Laws were debated and passed in 1601. The Poor 
Laws were no more than a summation of the cultural and legal 
developments represented by the various acts of the previous century, 
discussed above.73 The crux was to enable public relief for the 
deserving poor, largely by forcing them to work.74 
The Statute of Charitable Uses, passed in the same year, was 
intended to enable private charitable efforts by legally defining the 
concept of charity. The Statute's most recognizable and oft-quoted 
feature, its preamble, listed the charitable activities, or uses that the 
law would accept.75 They included: 
commerce and coming down, at least largely, on the side of commerce. We shall see 
this legislative choice repeated later in mid-1800s America. 
68. Leonard, supra note 35, at 70. 
69. Id. at 71. 
70. See id. at 72. 
71. 18 Eliz., c. 3 (1575) (Eng.). 
72. Id. 
73. Cf Gray, supra note 28, at 43; Trattner, supra note 7, at 10. 
74. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 11. 
75. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 40 (arguing the preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses "exercised a profound effect on later development[s] of the legal 
meaning of charity"). 
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[S]ome for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for 
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of 
learning, free schools, and scholars in universities, some for repair of 
bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and 
highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for 
or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, 
some for marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and 
help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and 
others for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid 
or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, 
setting out of soldiers and other taxes; ... "76 
The Statute of Charitable Uses remained good law for well over a 
century77 and to this day is considered by many as the starting point of 
the modern Anglo-American law of charity.78 As such, it is 
worthwhile to examine some of its features. 
First, the language of the Statute made plain that spirituality and 
religion were no longer at the heart of the legal definition of charity. 
The only glancing mention religion received was in the "repair of ... 
churches."79 It was not until many decades later, as the turmoil of the 
Reformation faded into memory, that the English common law 
definition of charity evolved to encompass religious uses.80 
The preamble to the Statute also confirmed that by 1601 charity had 
turned sharply toward social engineering. It encouraged charitable 
donors to consider the building of bridges, roads, and schools as 
legitimate charitable purposes. Charity had evolved from a spiritually 
charged activity to a more secular one, defined most broadly by the 
76. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601) (Eng.). 
77. For purposes of our inquiry, we need not trace English legal developments 
beyond the Statute of Charitable Uses. However, for the curious, we can summarize 
by saying that by 1736 there was a popular reaction in England against the steady 
increase of charitable land holdings that developed under the Statute. Parliament in 
that year passed the Mortmain Act, which, in essence, rendered most charitable 
bequests void and gutted the Statute. After more than a century of confusing and 
contradictory legal developments, Lord McNaughten brought some order back to the 
law of charity by offering a new legal definition that was essentially a summary of and 
slight elaboration upon the Statute. He declared that 
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the 
relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The Trusts last 
referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because 
incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity 
that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly. 
Comm'rs for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, 1 AC. 531, 583 (H.L. 
1891) (Lord McNaughten's judgment). 
78. See David C. Hammack, The Statute of Charitable Uses, in Making the 
Nonprofit Sector in the United States, supra note 47, at 5-6. 
79. 43 Eliz., c. 4. 
80. See Pemsel, l AC. at 531 (Lord McNaughten's judgment) (including religion 
within the legal definition of charity). 
2450 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
"public benefit."81 This was the beginning of the view, which later 
would become a central tenet of Anglo-American charity law, that 
donations for "public benefit" activities would be charitable, even if 
that benefit was not focused on the poor and distressed. 
Elizabeth's Statute and Poor Laws also represented the view, which 
had developed over the preceding centuries in England, that poverty 
was caused by immorality and sloth, and that it could be addressed by 
requiring the poor to work. The various acts leading up to the 1601 
legislation had vacillated over the proper level of cruelty with which to 
treat vagrants and beggars, but these vacillations were merely over 
degree. By 1601, there was no disagreement over the fact that some 
were deserving of charity while others-chiefly those who were 
considered "sturdy" - could rightly be left to starve if they refused to 
work.82 
It is particularly significant for our purposes that the Statute's 
strong legal and cultural predilection for work as a response to 
poverty included the "aid and supportation of young tradesmen, [and] 
handicraftsmen."83 Expressed in modem terms, the 1601 English law 
of charity approved of introducing the poor to the market and 
encouraging them to work their own way out of poverty.84 This notion 
of commercial activity as a tool for alleviating poverty later took root 
in America and, as we will discuss below, migrated to a central 
position in the American culture and law of charity. 
Before departing England and continuing our inquiry on the shores 
of the New World, it is important to emphasize two aspects of the 
history of late medieval charity that have reverberated through the 
centuries. First, as a result of the Reformation and the poverty laws 
that were passed under the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and 
Elizabeth I, charity became identified with work and enterprise. 
Second, although the pre-Reformation vulgar understanding of 
charity began to give way to the social engineering view, the older 
version never entirely disappeared. The Reformation and the various 
legislative acts of late medieval England secularized charity and 
reformed it into a mechanism for controlling poverty and pauperism, 
but charity never completely shed its compassionate, spiritual 
underpinnings. In spite of the broadening definition of charity, men 
and women were still motivated to engage in charitable works and 
81. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 47 (arguing the Statute of Charitable Uses 
made "public benefit" the key to the legal meaning of the term charity); Lieber, supra 
note 12, at 734. 
82. See Mencher, supra note 49, at xvi, 23, 33. 
83. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601) (Eng.). 
84. See Gray, supra note 28, at 18. 
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leave charitable bequests in hopes of making right with their creator 
and securing for themselves a comfortable place in the afterlife.85 
B. Charity Comes to America: From Cotton Mather to Scientific 
Philanthropy, Work Becomes Charity's Dominant Ethos 
1. Early Influences on American Charity: The Self-Help Tradition 
and Ascetic Protestantism 
Although it was clear from the start that the colonists would carry 
their charitable traditions along with them from England to the New 
World,86 it was just as clear that circumstances in the colonies would 
lead to a particularly American version of charity, one that would 
stress to an even greater extent than in England individual 
responsibility, the primacy of work and, eventually, high tolerance for 
blending charity and private enterprise. 
Two aspects of life in the New World shaped the development of 
American charity. First, New World communities came into existence 
before strong governments. In America, if public needs, including the 
needs of the destitute, were to be addressed at all, the communities 
themselves would have to take care of them.87 As the colonies 
developed, and later as the American frontier opened up, the 
tradition of self-help and caring for one's own-whether or not it 
happened in fact- became a central and celebrated part of our 
cultural narrative.88 
85. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 170 ( arguing " [ c ]harity in this broad sense-
'love thy neighbour as thyself' -remains a powerful if often unconscious influence 
even in these secular times ... there abides a certain fascination and respect for the 
principle of equal and unconditional concern for the welfare of every fellow human 
being"); Gray, supra note 28, at vii, 41-42 (arguing the old Judeo-Christian 
motivations for charity did not disappear with the Reformation). 
86. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 30 (noting that by 1691 Boston had four full-time 
overseers of the poor); Fishman, supra note 4, at 623 (some of the first state 
constitutions drawn up after the Revolution, including Massachusetts's, provided "[i]t 
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
Commonwealth ... to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and 
general benevolence, public and private charity ... and all social affections, and 
generous sentiments among the people"); Lieber, supra note 12, at 735 (noting that, in 
1620, before landing at Plymouth, forty-one passengers on the Mayflower signed the 
Mayflower Compact "expressing their commitment to provide for the common 
good"). 
87. See Lieber, supra note 12, at 734-35. In a related point, because the colonies 
lacked the feudal paternalism that colored England's sense of social responsibility, the 
poor of the New World were-to a degree even greater than in England-left out in 
the cold to either find work or starve. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 40-41. 
88. See Lieber, supra note 12, at 735. A close corollary of this celebration of self-
help was the central position of volunteerism in the American culture of charity. See 
Gurin & Van Ti!, supra note 2, at 6. While opinions vary over whether the 
combination of volunteerism and self-help are an effective strategy for dealing with 
social needs, there can be little doubt that they lie at the heart of Americans' 
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Second, the colonists' ascetic version of Protestantism had a strong 
impact on charity in the New World. Although the various sects that 
populated the colonies did not always agree on questions of religious 
doctrine,89 they shared beliefs about poverty and society's role in 
alleviating it. Like pre-Reformation Christians, the Protestants of the 
New World believed that misery and want were part of God's plan 
and thus inevitable.9° From there, however, their views diverged. In 
contrast to pre-Reformation Christianity's emphasis on communing 
with God by showing indiscriminate compassion toward the poor, the 
Protestants of the New World tended toward the belief that wealth 
was proof of goodness and selection by God, while poverty was 
evidence of the opposite.91 Each man was his own master under 
God,92 and each person's moral obligations were owed directly to Him 
rather than to fellow man. Under these guiding beliefs, the religious 
significance of charity faded somewhat.93 
In keeping with their beliefs about individual responsibility under 
the eyes of God, the colonists believed that the state and society had 
limited responsibility to provide for the welfare of individuals.94 
These views were reflected in the writings of the great proponents and 
spokespersons of American charity. Cotton Mather, for example, 
who preached to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the seventeenth 
century, was the main colonial exponent of "do-goodism."95 He held 
that all highborn individuals had a responsibility to undertake 
voluntary acts of charity, not as a means of salvation, but as a religious 
obligation owed to the God who had already selected them for 
salvation.96 He vigorously inveighed against unwise bestowal of alms 
lest they should encourage indolence on the part of the recipients.97 
Mather is remembered for scolding nostrums that helped define core 
concepts of American charity. Notably, he insisted that God intended 
the poor to work and that those who were able but refused should be 
left to starve.98 
conception of charity. See Gary N. Scrivner, 100 Years of Tax Policy Changes 
Affecting Charitable Organizations, in The Nonprofit Organization: Essential 
Readings, supra note 13, at 127 (arguing that "[c]itizens combating problems and 
reaching solutions on a collective basis, in associations, is inherent in the very nature 
of American societal structure"). 
89. See David C. Hammack, Colonial Reality: Religious Diversity, in The 
Nonprofit Sector, supra note 47, at 37. 
90. Trattner, supra note 7, at 38. 
91. Mencher, supra note 49, at 43. 
92. Id. at 62. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at 40. 
95. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 11. 
96. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 12. 
97. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 12-14. 
98. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 22. 
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Benjamin Franklin's writings also exerted influence over the 
development of American charity. His historical legacy has become 
closely identified with volunteerism and self-help, partly as a result of 
the many voluntary organizations he formed in Philadelphia, including 
the nation's first volunteer firehouse and the Junto Society, which, 
among other things, helped young men establish themselves in private 
enterprise.99 Franklin was harshly critical of social welfare systems 
that provided handouts to the poor. Visiting England in 1776, he said 
that their system, which was still based on the Elizabethan Poor Law, 
caused the poor to be "idle, dissolute, drunken and insolent."100 
Franklin introduced a more secular tinge to Mather's do-good gospel, 
nudging to the center of American charity the notion that industry 
and hard work were the only legitimate responses to want, and that 
charity should be limited to driving the poor out of poverty.101 
After the Revolution, American charity continued to focus on 
finding work for the poor, but there was a slight change in the 
philosophical justification of why this was the proper course. The 
Enlightenment, with its belief in rationality and boundless progress, 
wore away the grim determinism of Calvinist Protestantism and 
pushed aside the notion that misery and want were inevitable. It 
challenged the American public to do something to help the poor.102 
At the same time, Enlightenment thinking supported the idea - by 
now a settled aspect of the American charitable tradition- that the 
poor were responsible for their own plight.103 After all, in a land rich 
in natural resources and opportunity, what other than sloth and moral 
decrepitude could explain an individual's failure to prosper?104 
The result was a vast increase in nineteenth-century America of the 
number of organizations devoted to combating poverty, with most of 
them determined to carry out their missions by offering spiritual 
counseling and, foremost, by putting people to work. 105 
2. The Era of Friendly Visitors and Scientific Philanthropy 
The mid-nineteenth century was the beginning of the era of the 
"friendly visitor" or "friendly advice" in America that offered the 
99. See generally Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography: Recollections of Institution-
Building, 1771-84, in Hammack, The Nonprofit Sector, supra note 47, at 71, 74-75. 
100. Mencher, supra note 49, at 96. 
101. Bremner, supra note 22, at 17. 
102. Trattner, supra note 7, at 38. 
103. Id. at 54. 
104. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 144; Trattner, supra note 7, at 43 (arguing the 
tendency to equate charity with work was encouraged by the exploration and settling 
of the American West, which was propelled by a cultural creed of independence, self-
help, and personal achievement). 
105. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 144, 148; Trattner, supra note 7, at 43; Wagner, 
supra note 6, at 52. 
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poor "no alms, but sympathy and counsel." 106 In the view of the 
friendly visitors, since poverty was a personal failing that resulted 
from moral weakness, the solution was a friend from the middle class 
who would instruct the unfortunate in the ways of clean, upright, 
prosperous living. 107 The friendly visitors were in the business of 
building character, not necessarily relieving need.108 Money was not 
to change hands. 109 
Josephine Shaw, who in the late nineteenth century was famous as a 
fierce proponent of the concept of friendly visiting, expressed the 
visitors' fixation on work when she declared that "the world [is] made 
of two classes: workers and idlers."110 She and the friendly visitors 
would provide structure and guidance for the former, while the latter, 
as Cotton Mather preached in colonial days, could be left to starve.111 
The stingy benevolence112 of the friendly visitor movement and 
general focus on work as the core of American charity and 
philanthropy was interrupted during the Civil War years. Warnings 
about unwise giving of promiscuous alms were forgotten in the face of 
widespread suffering and need.113 During the war the central 
government became more involved in poverty relief and the 
experience encouraged the view that its presence was necessary to 
achieve meaningful social welfare.114 However, the wartime 
generosity brought increased public debt and higher taxes, which 
caused a backlash of hostility to public poor relief in the postwar 
years.115 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the rise of so-
called "scientific philanthropy." Aside from its name, there was 
nothing particularly new about scientific philanthropy. Benjamin 
Franklin had preached a similar message 150 years earlier. 116 
However, because the "scientific" approach was espoused by the 
omnipotent robber barons of the day, it became the dominant ethos in 
turn-of-the-century and early-twentieth-century American charity. 
"Rags-to-riches" had become a popular cultural narrative in the 
United States as men like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller 
amassed fortunes that would have been unimaginable a generation 
106. Trattner, supra note 7, at 69. 
107. Bremner, supra note 22, at 99-100 (arguing the "friendly visitor" notion was 
founded on a conviction of superiority). 
108. Id. at 100. 
109. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 48. 
110. Bremner, supra note 22, at 97. 
111. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
112. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 100 (arguing the friendly visitors were stingy in 
that they ignored empirical evidence that showed that poverty resulted from 
accidents, sickness, and market fluctuations, not from indolence). 
113. Bremner, supra note 22, at 75; Trattner, supra note 7, at 77. 
114. Trattner, supra note 7, at 81. 
115. Bremner, supra note 22, at 76-88. 
116. See id. at 89-104; see also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
2005] REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY 2455 
earlier.117 Steeped in Social Darwinism, they believed it was a waste 
of time to defy the evolutionary process by supporting the weaker of 
the species,118 those who in earlier generations would have been 
referred to as the "undeserving," "idle," or "sturdy" poor. Although 
Carnegie and his brethren recognized that the state bore some 
responsibility for caring for the destitute and helpless, they firmly 
believed that the philanthropy of the wealthy should focus on the able 
and the industrious.119 Carnegie himself was contemptuous of 
sentimental alms giving, 120 specifically rejecting the notion that 
anything valuable could be accomplished by imitating the life or 
methods of Christ,121 and believing that "the best means of benefiting 
the community is to place within its reach the ladders upon which the 
aspiring can rise."122 In the view of Carnegie and the other scientific 
philanthropists, rationality, efficiency, foresight, and planning were 
middle-class virtues that had proved their worth in the realm of for-
profit enterprise, and now it was time to apply those same virtues in 
the realm of charity.123 In an articulation of charity that would 
resurface forcefully a century later, Carnegie demanded to know 
whether proposed recipients of aid would make good investment 
vehicles.124 
Along with the rise of scientific philanthropy came a related but less 
noticed trend in American charity. To a degree that had not 
previously been evident, the idea of engaging in and encouraging 
commerce was accepted as part of a broadening definition of 
charity. 125 In many states, there developed a high tolerance for 
business methods and commercial strategies among charities.126 For 
example, an 1888 tort case from Pennsylvania addressed the question 
of whether a fire patrol that benefited the public but was funded and 
motivated by the commercial interests of fire insurance companies 
could be considered charitable. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
began its analysis by examining a traditional definition of charity: "It 
is whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love of your 
117. Trattner, supra note 7, at 95. 
118. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 103; see also Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the 
Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, Volunteerism, and Nonprofit 
Organizations 121 (1992) (arguing that modern philanthropy was born when Social 
Darwinism, industrial wealth, and academic expertise came together in the 1890s). 
119. Bremner, supra note 22, at 105-21; see also Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas 
Ehrlich, The World We Must Build, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a 
Changing America, supra note 16, at 501. 
120. Bremner, supra note 22, at 108. 
121. Id. at 107. 
122. Hall, supra note 118, at 45. 
123. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 94. 
124. Hall, supra note 118, at 118. 
125. See Norman I. Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the 
Modern Nonprofit Sector 47 (2001). 
126. Id. at 45. 
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neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense; given from these 
motives, and to those ends, free from the stain or taint of every 
consideration that is personal, private, or selfish. "127 The court 
concluded, however, that such Christian purity of heart was not a 
necessary element of American charity, and that the fire insurance 
companies' commercial motivations were beside the point, so long as 
their activity was benefiting the public at large. 128 
In an oft-cited case from 1899, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
was asked to decide whether a home for aged and disabled men 
qualified for property tax purposes as charitable where it paid for its 
operations-including a mortgage note and superintendents' 
salaries-by purchasing firewood, requiring residents to turn it into 
kindling, and then selling it for a profit.129 The court had no trouble 
finding that "[w]here the objects and purposes of the institution are 
wholly charitable, with no element of private gain, the receipt of 
compensation from those who enjoy the benefits do not affect its 
charitable nature." 130 
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon in 
1905 to decide whether a home for young workingwomen was 
charitable where it rented its rooms to the young women at moderate 
cost. 131 The court pointed directly to the "supportation, aid and help 
of young tradesmen" language in the preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses132 in deciding that launching young women into 
employment was a charitable purpose, even where they were paying 
nominal rent to cover the costs of the charitable operation. 133 
Beginning in the late 1800s and continuing through the roaring 
decade of the 1920s it became increasingly acceptable in the eyes of 
127. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 A. 553, 554 (Pa. 1888). 
128. See id. at 555-56; see also Trs. of Ky. Female Orphan Sch. v. Louisville, 36 S.W. 
921, 923 (Ky. 1896) (charity does not lose its character as such if it receives revenue 
from the recipients of its bounty sufficient to keep it in operation); Contributors to 
Pa. Hosp. v. Delaware County, 32 A. 456, 457 (Pa. 1895) (holding that a convalescent 
farm used by a hospital is charitable and thus exempt from property tax even though 
the farm produces a profit for the hospital); Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal 
Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 57 (Pa. 1892) (holding that the definition of "charity," 
which had been steadily broadening, now included a school open to the public that 
charged students enough to maintain itself in operation); House of Refuge v. Smith, 
21 A. 353, 354 (Pa. 1891) (holding juvenile correction home charitable for property 
tax purposes even though residents work at jobs that produce some income for 
organization). 
129. Patterson Rescue Mission v. High, 44 A. 974, 974-75 (N.J. 1899). 
130. Id. at 975. 
131. Franklin Square House v. Boston, 74 N.E. 675, 675 (Mass. 1905). 
132. See supra note 76. 
133. Read v. Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc., 116 A. 898 (Del. Ch. 1922) (finding a 
trade association formed to move coal efficiently through tidewater ports charitable); 
Franklin Square, 74 N.E. at 676; see also House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v. 
Bd. of Equalization (In re House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha), 203 N.W. 632 
(Neb. 1925) (ruling a laundry that produces considerable revenue at a home for fallen 
women is charitable). 
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judges and policymakers for charity and enterprise to grow toward 
one another.134 This trend slowed with the onset of the Great 
Depression,135 but as we shall see, arose again in modern times and 
has moved toward the core of American charity. 
3. The Persistence of Charity as Love 
We must once again pause to note that although the story of charity 
in the New World was one of increasing insistence on work as a 
solution for poverty and increasing acceptance of commerce as a tool 
of charity, the old-world, pre-Reformation view of charity as Christian 
love was also transported to America. During times of widespread 
crisis and hardship, most notably the Civil War and the Great 
Depression, compassion-based charity and "promiscuous almsgiving" 
came back into style, if only temporarily. 136 Even in times of peace 
and relative prosperity there was a consistent hum of criticism of 
scientific philanthropy and the "work or starve" social engineering 
conception of charity from clergy who insisted that Christ demanded 
uncalculating brotherly love from his servants.137 In their view, the 
spiritual aspects of charity, including the creation of a community of 
feeling and a set of human bonds, were as significant as the charitable 
service itself.138 
Even outside the church there were signs that the older, pre-
Reformation, vulgar notions of charity were not completely swept 
aside by the headlong rush to friendly visiting and scientific 
philanthropy. For example, in the late 1800s, Clara Barton's work 
forming the Red Cross focused on relieving suffering. She had little 
interest in reforming charity or philanthropy to conform to 
Enlightenment or Social-Darwinist views.139 
Likewise, the Settlement House movement that grew up around 
Jane Addams at the turn of the twentieth century was largely a 
negative reaction to the primacy of the social engineering, emotionally 
and spiritually sterile "friendly visitor" movement and "scientific 
philanthropy."140 The goal of that movement was to address poverty 
and its conditions, which alone did not distinguish it from "friendly 
visiting." However, its doctrine and its methods were steeped in 
spirituality and included goals of forming spiritual bonds and a sense 
134. See Silber, supra note 125, at 47. 
135. See id. 
136. See supra notes 113, 135 and accompanying text. 
137. See Hall, supra note 118, at 125. 
138. Id. at 127. 
139. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 90. 
140. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 163. See generally Jane Addams, Twenty Years 
at Hull-House (1910). 
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of universal brotherhood between people of different stations. 141 Jane 
Addams herself proudly admitted that the Settlement House 
movement was based on spirituality and emotion as much as 
conviction.142 
To take another, somewhat later example, the Catholic Worker 
movement, founded by Dorothy Day in the early 1930s, focused on 
poverty but clung always to a mission of doing God's work by building 
a spiritual community that included both the poor and the powerful.143 
C. American Charity from the Great Depression to Ronald Reagan 
During the Great Depression, alms to the poor and distressed again 
became acceptable-as they had during the Civil War-in the face of 
suffering that was so widespread it could not be explained as the result 
of indolence or immorality. 144 Faced with the colossal need, it also 
became evident to all that private philanthropy could not cope by 
itself, notwithstanding Herbert Hoover's insistence to the contrary. 145 
It thus became a broadly accepted view during the Depression that 
private and public charity should both be encouraged and work in 
concert.146 
This attitude of cooperation between government and private 
actors helped fuel an explosion of charitable activity within the 
nonprofit sector,147 particularly after 1960.148 A trend developed in 
which the government used private charities to carry out its ambitious 
New Deal, and later Great Society, social welfare plans. 149 The trend 
continued into the 1970s, partly because of Americans' general 
141. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that, like the "friendly visitors," the 
Settlement House movement was based on class assumptions that the poor could be 
ennobled by association with decent Americans of higher class and education); see 
also Trattner supra note 7, at 183 (noting that the Settlement House movement, in 
spite of its emotional and spiritual origins, included an emphasis on empirical 
research, which ultimately helped dispel the notion that poverty was caused by 
immorality, and helped demonstrate that intervention by the state could relieve 
suffering. Many meaningful labor reforms, including child labor laws, grew out of the 
Settlement movement). 
142. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 114. 
143. See generally Dorothy Day, The Long Loneliness: The Autobiography of 
Dorothy Day (1952). 
144. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 140; Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Pub. 
Needs, supra note 2, at 92 (noting "[t]he Depression ... shattered the myth that 
private charity could tide the deserving poor over bad times"); Wagner, supra note 6, 
at 66-67. 
145. Trattner, supra note 7, at 276-77. 
146. Id. at 214. 
147. Hall, supra note 118, at 62-63. 
148. Silber, supra note 125, at 143; see Bremner, supra note 22, at 201. 
149. Kirsten A. Gr!Zlnbjerg & Lester M. Salamon, Devolution, Marketization, and 
the Changing Shape of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in The State of Nonprofit 
America, supra note 2, at 452 (arguing that most of the Great Society programs of the 
1960s and 1970s operated with and through nonprofits). 
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distrust of government as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, partly 
because of a growing societal unhappiness with what was considered a 
government-caused "welfare mess." 150 
The new federalism that developed, in part to respond to this 
general air of distrust, included Title XX of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1974, which allowed states to use federal money to 
fund whatever social services they thought appropriate. 151 State and 
local governments rapidly expanded the use of "purchase of service 
agreements" under which they paid private charities to carry out state 
social welfare policy .152 
This trend had an important formative effect on modern American 
charity. One change, mentioned above, was the rapid expansion in 
the number of nonprofit charities.153 Another was an enormous 
increase in the complexity of the charitable nonprofit sector. As 
governments, the federal government in particular, became more 
important sources of support for charitable nonprofits, they attached 
regulations of Byzantine complexity to the grant of funds. Charities 
were forced to expand their organizational capacities and technology 
just to keep pace with government demands. By the 1980s, the 
organizational technology of voluntary action, once fairly simple and 
manageable, had by some accounts become a monopoly of the 
articulate and highly educated.154 For the first time in history, it 
seemed that a successful manager of a charitable organization needed 
to have an MBA or law degree just to understand the applicable 
government regulations.155 
The years of the Reagan administration marked a new era in 
charity, one that ultimately pushed the entire charitable sector in the 
direction of the free market. There were two main causes of this shift: 
First, the federal government under Reagan cut back on funds going 
to charitable organizations; second, those funds that were earmarked 
for charity were doled out using the supply-side schemes that the 
administration applied to all social problems. 
In earlier periods of American history, widespread economic 
hardship usually had given rise to an expansion of the charitable 
sector and a governmental and cultural support for funding charities 
that addressed the suffering.156 The Reagan years, however, were 
marked by steep cuts in federal expenditures, including cuts in funds 
150. Bremner, supra note 22, at 201. 
151. Id. at 202. 
152. Id. 
153. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
154. See Hall, supra note 118, at 8. 
155. Charity workers in the United States had begun to seek professional status in 
the early 1900s, around the time the academic disciplines of social work and sociology 
were coming on the scene. Bremner, supra note 22, at 109; Trattner, supra note 7, at 
234. 
156. See supra notes 113, 135 and accompanying text. 
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going to charitable nonprofit organizations, during times of recession 
and mounting unemployment. 157 The Reagan administration cut the 
federal government with evangelical zeal and rhetorically encouraged 
the charitable nonprofit sector to take up the slack, but at the same 
time it worked to cut government money going to that sector and to 
reduce incentives for individuals and corporations to donate to it.158 
Under these conditions, many charitable nonprofit organizations 
failed, 159 and those that survived did so by resorting increasingly to 
entrepreneurial, market-oriented strategies.160 The American law and 
culture of charity had long ago begun permitting commercial activity 
in support of charity,161 but during the Reagan administration, for the 
first time in U.S. history, law and policy converged to compel charities 
to engage in commerce to survive. 
Scarce funding was not the only factor pushing nonprofit 
organizations toward the market. During the Reagan administration 
many of the funding programs for social services were converted, in 
accordance with the administration's supply-side preferences, from 
grants and contracts for the benefit of charitable organizations to 
vouchers and tax expenditures that channeled the increasingly scarce 
available resources to the consumers of social services rather than the 
157. Bremner, supra note 22, at 207. 
158. Hall, supra note 118, at 80; see also Lester M. Salamon, Nonprofit 
Organizations: The Lost Opportunity, in The Nonprofit Organization: The Essential 
Readings, supra note 13, at 114 (arguing that Reagan had an opportunity to forge 
stronger links with the nonprofit sector but failed and instead relied on exhortation 
and on the assumption that his economic program would suffuse the country with 
volunteer spirit; to accomplish this, the administration increased demands on the 
nonprofit sector while decreasing revenues); Lester M. Salamon, The Resilient Sector: 
The State of Nonprofit America, in The State of Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at 
12-13 [hereinafter The Resilient Sector]. Salamon argues that the Reagan 
administration attacked government spending in areas where charitable nonprofits 
were most vulnerable-social and human services, education and training, community 
development, and non-hospital health. Federal support outside of Medicare and 
Medicaid declined by twenty-five percent in real dollar terms during the 1980s and 
returned to 1980 levels only in the late 1990s; then, in 1994, the Contract With 
America cut even more. Gr¢nbjerg & Salamon, supra note 149, at 447; The Resilient 
Sector, supra, at 12-13. . Gr¢nbjerg and Salamon here argue that the government 
funding that fueled the growth of the charitable nonprofit sector in the 1960s and 
1970s declined in early 1980s in both absolute and constant terms, at least outside of 
health care. By the 1990s, the real value of federal support to nonprofit organizations 
was nineteen percent below its 1980 level in social services and education, forty-two 
percent below in community development. Gr¢nbjerg & Salamon, supra note 149, at 
447; Steven Rathgeb Smith, Social Services, in The State of Nonprofit America, supra 
note 2, at 161 (arguing the Reagan administration's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1981 cut spending and shifted spending decisions to the states, which in turn 
cut funding to nonprofits, particularly in areas of legal aid, family planning, and 
housing services). 
159. Bremner, supra note 22, at 206. 
160. Hall, supra note 118, at 80. 
161. See supra notes 84, 125-33 and accompanying text. 
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producers. 162 This meant that the charitable organizations were forced 
to focus energy on marketing themselves and their services so that 
they could compete effectively against rival nonprofits as well as an 
increasing number of for-profit providers. 163 
The charitable nonprofits often found that they had to compete 
against for-profit firms where the for-profit providers had a clear 
edge,164 which in turn increased the ferocity with which the nonprofits 
turned to the market. Charitable nonprofit organizations often lost 
out in the supply-side free-for-all set up by the Reagan administration 
policies, because for-profit firms were able to enter the social services 
market and siphon off clients that were the least costly to treat, 
leaving charitable nonprofits to handle the rest despite government 
reimbursement rates that were insufficient to cover costs. 165 
Charitable nonprofit organizations tended to react to this supply-side 
competition by either folding or becoming more entrepreneurial and 
commercial.166 
The Reagan revolution irrevocably changed the law and culture of 
charity in the United States and in some respects exacerbated our 
society's confused conception of charity's nature. Charity in this 
country had always included such tenets as "work or starve," the 
rejection of charity for the undeserving poor, and an acceptance of the 
free-market and commercial activity as vehicles for achieving 
charitable ends. However, the conservative political revolution 
ushered in by Reagan brought those tenets to the core of our society's 
conception of charity. At the same time as the Reagan administration 
was forcing the commercialization of the nonprofit sector, its rhetoric 
celebrated the older, compassionate, spiritually charged conception. 
President Reagan offered a vision of society's poor and distressed 
being tended to by compassionate private actors who would stoop 
down to offer succor. He declared that "volunteerism is an essential 
part of our plan to give the government back to the people. "167 His 
administration would restore the "American Spirit" of voluntary 
162. See Salamon, The Resilient Sector, supra note 158, at 13. 
163. Lester M. Salamon, Nonprofit Organizations: The Lost Opportunity, in The 
Nonprofit Organization, supra note 13, at 122. 
164. Id. at 16. For example, $2 billion in federal daycare subsidies were delivered 
through a special childcare tax credit, so nonprofit daycare providers were thrown 
into the private market to secure public money for their operations. They were 
forced to focus on marketing and on mastering the complex billing and 
reimbursement systems that had been more common in the for-profit world. This was 
happening at a time of rapid technological development, when for-profits were better 
able to acquire technology because they could more readily raise the necessary 
capital. Id. 
165. Grpnbjerg & Salamon, supra note 149, at 457. 
166. See Heather Gottry, Note, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service 
Organizations & Social Entrepreneurship, 6 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 249, 254-55 
(1999). 
167. Bremner, supra note 22, at 206. 
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service and cooperation, of private and community initiative.168 What 
he would not do is pay to address the suffering that the well-meaning 
volunteers failed to stem.169 
D. Where We Find Ourselves Now 
Charity in the United States has undergone further transformation 
in the last decade. As we have seen, there is nothing new about 
insisting that charity be conducted with entrepreneurial zeal, about 
offering work to the poor instead of alms, or about relying on market-
oriented solutions to poverty. Cotton Mather believed in work for the 
poor and the lash for the unwilling. Benjamin Franklin believed that 
the proper role of charity was to show promising young men how to 
become prosperous. State courts in America during the mid- and late 
1800s became comfortable with blending charity and for-profit 
enterprise. Andrew Carnegie insisted on all of the above, and that 
charity be given only where its efficacy could be demonstrated 
through scientific study. However, even with all of these historical 
antecedents, it was not until recent decades that charity in our culture 
became overwhelmingly and, it seems irrevocably, associated with 
enterprise and commerce. Let us view the evidence of the turn that 
charity has taken. 
A glance at the nonprofit section of any local bookstore is 
illuminating. Peons to the deeds of Mother Teresa and Dorothy Day, 
proponents of the older, Christian love version of charity, have been 
squeezed out by such titles as Venture Forth!: The Essential Guide to 
Starting a Moneymaking Business in Your Nonprofit Organization,170 
Selling Social Change (Without Selling Out): Earned Income Strategies 
for Nonprofits, I7I Strategic Tools for Social Entrepreneurs: Enhancing 
the Performance of Your Enterprising Nonprofit, 172 The Social 
Enterprise Sourcebook, I73 and finally, the charities' guide to 
"Comparative Performance Measurement."174 For managers of those 
charitable organizations that survived the Reagan era, and whose 
168. Id.; see also Gottry, supra note 166, at 253-54 (arguing that both President 
George H.W. Bush's "Points of Light" strategy and President Bill Clinton's backing 
of AmeriCorps endorsed the Reaganesque notion that social services could be 
provided by well-meaning volunteers). 
169. Hall, supra note 118, at 89 (arguing the Reagan administration almost 
destroyed the nonprofit sector under the pretext of getting the federal government 
out of nonprofits' way). 
170. Rolfe Larson, Venture Forth!: The Essential Guide to Starting a 
Moneymaking Business in Your Nonprofit Organization (2002). 
171. Andy Robinson, Selling Social Change (Without Selling Out): Earned 
Income Strategies for Nonprofits (2002). 
172. Greg Dees et al., Strategic Tools for Social Entrepreneurs: Enhancing the 
Performance of Your Enterprising Nonprofit (2002). 
173. Jerr Boschee, The Social Enterprise Sourcebook (2001). 
174. Scott P. Bryant et al., Comparative Performance Measurement (2001 ). 
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organizations have been forced to retool themselves to compete in the 
free market, these guidebooks are essential reading. 
The headlong rush by American charities toward 
"commercialization" and "marketization" can perhaps be understood 
best if we divide the movement into two categories that in reality are 
different aspects of the same phenomenon: social entrepreneurship 
and venture philanthropy. 
1. Social Entrepreneurship 
Faced with increasing competition for donations and public funds, 
and under pressure from philanthropic foundations, 175 a growing 
number of nonprofit charities are adopting the culture and practices 
of commercial ventures.176 Twenty years ago the word "entrepreneur" 
did not exist in the world of charities. Now nonprofits "identify their 
market niches, to maximize their comparative advantages, to think of 
their clients as customers, to devise marketing plans, and to engage in 
strategic planning."177 They worry to an ever-greater extent about 
measurable outcomes and impact, assessing their performance, and 
demonstrating their cost-effectiveness.178 
A few concrete examples from the charitable sector will illustrate 
this sea change. In Durham, North Carolina, a charitable, long-term 
residential drug rehabilitation center is designed such that the 
recovering addicts work in profit-making businesses ranging from 
bricklaying to house painting. These businesses serve the dual 
purpose of training the addicts for life after drug dependency and 
generating millions of untaxed dollars per year that go to support the 
organization's operating budget. Although members of Durham's 
business community occasionally complain about having to compete 
with a charity,179 the organization most often is lauded in the local 
press for showing plucky, entrepreneurial spirit and for running a 
175. See infra Part 11.D.2. 
176. Sharon Oster, Nonprofit Ventures: The Good Ones Are Profitable, Chron. 
Philanthropy, Apr. 15, 2002, at 18; see also Salamon, The Resilient Sector, supra note 
158, at 30-38 (arguing charitable nonprofits have undergone a "quiet revolution" and 
adopted an "enterprise culture"); Young & Salamon, supra note 3, at 424 (arguing 
commercial activity in the nonprofit sector is not new but it appears to have taken a 
quantum leap over the past decade or more); Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Reid, 
Note, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for Unrelated Commercial Activity in 
Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1855, 1856-58 (2001). 
177. Young & Salamon,supra note 3, at 437. 
178. Id.; see also Gary Walker & Jean Grossman, Philanthropy and Outcomes: 
Dilemmas in the Quest for Accountability, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in 
a Changing America, supra note 16, at 450 (claiming the "outcomes movement" 
represents a more stylish, current jargon for a concept that has existed for a long 
time). 
179. See Ronnie Glassberg, Nonprofit Competing in Private Sector Criticized, 
Durham Herald Sun, Jan. 7, 2001, at Bl. 
2464 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
large charity that costs taxpayers very little. 180 In New York, the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art generates tens of millions of dollars 
through its gift shops, restaurants, parking garages, and other 
commercial ventures. 181 Most of that money is exempt from taxation, 
and the proceeds go to support the museum's charitable mission. 182 In 
Chicago, the Field Museum holds after-hours cocktail socials to 
generate revenue to support its charitable mission, and in Nashville, 
Baptist Hospital built and maintains a fifteen million dollar training 
facility to rent to the Tennessee Titans football team, thus benefiting 
from both rental profits and football-related marketing 
opportunities. 183 Lest there should be any doubt that the era of profit-
making, entrepreneurial charity has arrived, the Yale School of 
Management recently teamed with the Goldman Sachs Foundation 
and the Pew Charitable Trusts to create a Partnership on Nonprofit 
Ventures that makes cash awards and provides technical assistance to 
encourage charities to engage in profit-making activities to support 
their missions.184 
2. Venture Philanthropy 
"Venture Philanthropy" is the term used to describe private grant-
making foundations' sharp tum in recent years toward the theory and 
practice of the for-profit world. It is the better-funded doppelganger 
of "social entrepreneurship." 
The popular press celebrates this trend, sometimes under the term 
"new philanthropy," as an exciting group of social venture capitalists 
"who use Wall Street solutions to tackle urban poverty."185 They 
combine the "desire to help the needy with a geek's approach to 
problem solving," they "invest" their money rather than donate it, and 
they are guided by the fundamental question of "[w]here is the highest 
return on investment?"186 The press condemns "old philanthropy" as 
money "doled out by bureaucrats from mahogany-paneled rooms," 
180. Paul Bonner, TROSA Breathing New Life Into Old Plant: Milk Factory to 
House Budding Enterprises for Recovering Addicts, Durham Herald Sun, Nov. 14, 
1996, at Cl; Rick Martinez, Moving Into the Mainstream, News & Observer (Raleigh), 
Dec. 24, 2003, at All; Karine Michael, Nonprofits in Business to Pay Own Way; 
Fewer Grants, Growing Need Force Review of Bottom Line, Durham Herald Sun, 
Sept. 9, 1998, at Bl. 
181. Stephanie Strom, Nonprofit Groups Reach for Profits on the Side, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 17,2002,atl32. 
182. Id. 
183. John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 487, 489 (2002). 
184. In Brief- Managing, Chron. Philanthropy, May 2, 2002, at 26; see also Yale 
Sch. of Mgmt.-The Goldman Sachs Found. P'ship on Nonprofit Ventures, 
Homepage, at http://ventures.yale.edu (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
185. Michele Orecklin, How Better to Give, Chron. Philanthropy, Nov. 5, 2001, at 
78. 
186. Adam Cohen, When You Have $24 Billion ... , Time, Nov. 5, 2001, at 80. 
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and celebrates the new philanthropists as a "new breed of social 
entrepreneurs coming out of Harvard Business School or failed dot-
coms."187 
Modeling themselves on venture capital firms, the venture 
philanthropists seek to "catalyze major public change," by creating 
"nonprofit capital markets" in which funders manage "portfolios of 
social investments" with varying degrees of "social risk and return."188 
They use a combination of "grant and loan instruments" to implement 
their investments, try to "maximize the social returns on their 
investments," and even use "metrics," "technology-based tools," and 
rating services to carry out their social return assessments. 189 Like 
venture capitalists, venture philanthropists often demand seats on the 
boards of the organizations they back, and from the start they create 
an exit strategy in case their performance expectations are not met. 190 
Accelerating this trend, a host of intermediary organizations have 
sprung up to teach donors how to adopt this model, and, ultimately, 
"pick social investment winners."191 
For our purposes, the main effect of all this venture philanthropy is 
that the charitable organizations that depend on philanthropic 
donations are forced to adopt the methods of business and venture 
capital if they want to continue to receive the foundations' support. In 
the 197Os and 198Os, it was the government that was pushing charities 
toward the market. Today, private foundations are doing the same. 
Commentators on American charity range from enthusiastic to 
apprehensive192 about the explosion of venture philanthropy and 
187. Adam Piore, Charities That Hate to Just "Give," Newsweek, Feb. 4, 2002, at 
37. 
188. Id. 
189. Young & Salamon, supra note 3, at 438; see also Todd Coher, Global 
Marketplace: Rockefeller Foundation Launches Acumen Fund, The Non-Profit 
Times, Aug. 15, 2001, at 15; Dana Flavelle, Charities Run Like For-Profit Businesses, 
Toronto Star, Apr. 22, 2002, at Cl (discussing a billionaire venture capitalist who 
developed a method for measuring "social return on investment" or SROI); Brad 
Wolverton, "Business Week": A New Era of Philanthropy, Chron. Philanthropy, Dec. 
12, 2002, at 31. See generally Acumen Fund, Homepage, at 
http://www.acumenfund.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
190. Piore, supra note 187, at 37. 
191. Scott Harris, Giving When It Hurts, The Industry Standard.Com, July 30, 2001, 
at http://www.theindustrystandard.com (helping foundations "convert from the 
bureaucratic paradigm" to the methods of "strategic philanthropists"); see Beth 
Healy, Strategy for Giving Start-Up a Vehicle for Budding Philanthropists, Boston 
Globe, Nov. 23, 2001, at B14. 
192. Criticisms are many, but perhaps two varieties are most common. First are the 
ethical and legal criticisms. Commentators point to numerous instances where 
entrepreneurial charitable organizations either enrich their principle staff people or 
divert business toward for-profit affiliates. See, e.g., Burton A. Weisbrod, The 
Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links Between Nonprofits and the Rest 
of the Economy, in To Profit or Not To Profit: The Commercial Transformation Of 
The Nonprofit Sector 1 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998) (discussing a widely criticized 
endorsement deal between the nonprofit American Medical Association and the 
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social entrepreneurship in the United States, but practically all agree 
that the shift has been developing for a long time, has deep roots in 
American culture, and that it is here to stay.193 
E. Summary 
Man's tendency to act charitably toward his fellow man is a "hard 
wired" aspect of humanity, and charity as a fundamental social and 
cultural norm can be traced to antiquity. The Anglo-American legal 
and cultural tradition of charity sprang out of Judeo-Christian notions 
of love and selflessness. The pre-Reformation version of charity 
required God's servants to aid the suffering without inquiry into 
whether they were deserving of kindness.194 
As early as the thirteenth century, there were rumblings that charity 
would be caught up in the drastic economic and social changes 
unfolding in England. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there 
were halting, awkward legislative efforts to contain the wandering and 
Sunbeam Corporation); Gary E. Knell, Sesame Workshop Misrepresented, Chron. 
Philanthropy, Nov. 15, 2001, at 39 (discussing and defending against accusation that 
nonprofits are making untoward, tax-exempt profits); Editorial, Marie C. Malaro, 
Former Director ... , Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 2002, at B2 (reporting controversy when a 
corporate donor to the Smithsonian Institute gave forceful input on the content of 
funded exhibits); Jeffrey R. Young, College Board Shuts Down For-Profit Entity, 
Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 24, 2003, at A34 (claiming it is ethically suspect for a 
nonprofit testing organization to sell on-line services related to its tests). Second, 
critics point to erosion of society's trust in charities as they become more 
commercially market-oriented. See Clotfelter & Ehrlich, The World We Must Build, 
in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America, supra note 16, at 
500. The argument is that the charitable nonprofit sector has provided American 
society with a philosophical structure and a language with which to express moral 
values and a noncompetitive arena in which to build a stronger civil society. Robert L. 
Payton, A Tradition in Jeopardy, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a 
Changing America, supra note 16, at 485. Now, however, the nonprofit sector's 
claims to exist for the public good-the very grounds on which society justifies 
exempting the sector from taxation-are no longer taken on faith. The growing 
confluence of the market and charity is feeding the idea that the charitable sector is 
not the only, nor necessarily the best, guardian of public worth. Evelyn Brody, 
Accountability and Public Trust, in The State of Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at 
472. There is one other broad category of criticism of the blending of sectors: a 
practical critique. It holds that the need to generate income and closely justify all 
expenditures leaves charities little incentive to focus services on the poor because 
serving them costs the most. The pressure to be entrepreneurial pushes managers of 
charitable organizations away from assuming responsibility for costly services. In 
such a system, who is going to take care of the crack addicts and ex-offenders? See 
William Diaz, For Whom and for What? The Contributions of the Nonprofit Sector, in 
The State of Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at 519; see also Young & Salamon, 
Commercialization, Social Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, in The State of 
Nonprofit America, supra note 3, at 442. 
193. See Glen Gose, A Revolution Was Ventured but What Did it Gain?, Chron. 
Philanthropy, Aug. 21, 2003, at 6 (reporting that venture philanthropy's influence has 
continued despite the economic downturn). 
194. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 30. 
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begging that was arising as a result of enclosures and early 
mercantilism.195 
The reign of Henry VIII marked a stark change in the law and 
culture of Anglo-American charity. Henry's Reformation, combined 
with the enclosure movement and the rise of mercantile capitalism, 
gave rise to a new conception of charity that was more secular, 
focused on addressing poverty and pauperism ("social engineering") 
rather than divine grace for the donor, and included at its core the 
notion that enterprise and work were the most effective tools for 
addressing poverty. 
Through numerous legislative acts in the sixteenth century, 
culminating in the Poor Laws and the Statute of Charitable Uses of 
1601, the state acknowledged that it, along with private donors, had a 
role to play in addressing poverty. Its preferred method for carrying 
out that role was to force work upon those in need, and to severely 
punish the sturdy poor who shirked. 
Early American charity followed a similar path, and was premised 
on the belief of man's individual responsibility before God, on the 
discouragement of "promiscuous alms," and on the identification of 
work with moral rectitude and divine approval.196 After the Civil War, 
with the rise of friendly visiting and scientific philanthropy, the 
attitude of poverty as moral vice persisted, while at the same time the 
language and methods of the free market began to infiltrate American 
charity. After the turn of the century, American culture and 
American law began to accept the view that commercial activity could 
and indeed should be closely associated with charity. 
The Reagan revolution pushed charities toward the market by 
cutting back on funds for their operations and by implementing 
policies that compelled them to compete-with one another and with 
for-profit companies-for scarce dollars. At the same time, the 
Reagan administration and subsequent administrations celebrated a 
rhetoric of compassionate service to the needy and volunteerism. 
During the 1990s, the trend toward commercialization of charity 
strengthened as technology-boom millionaires entered the charitable 
realm and insisted on the adoption of business methods, and as 
private foundations increasingly adopted the rhetoric and practices of 
venture philanthropy. By the end of the 1990s, it was becoming 
difficult to distinguish between business and charity. 
It is important for our purposes to emphasize that while the cultural 
and legal conception of charity has shifted away from alms to the poor 
and toward social engineering since the reign of Henry VIII, the older 
brand of vulgar charity has persisted.197 
195. See Leonard, supra note 35, at 9; supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra Part I.B.5. 
197. See supra Part I.B.l.; see also Gray, supra note 28, at vii. 
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II. CHARITY LAW IN THE UNITED ST A TES: THE DEEP ROOTS OF 
CONFUSION 
We have completed a sweep through the history of Anglo-
American charity. We have seen how our culture has maintained 
through the centuries a split definition of charity, meaning both aid to 
the poor based on love and compassion and social engineering, often 
premised on the assumption that providing work was the primary, if 
not the only, valid response to poverty. We will now narrow our focus 
to the American law of charity and discover that our society's 
unresolved definition of charity has led to a legal regime that most 
commentators consider incoherent198 and confusing. 199 
A. Confusion in Early Case Law Definitions of Charity 
Today, most charity law in the United States emanates from the 
federal government, particularly in the Internal Revenue Code and 
the accompanying regulations. However, federal tax laws did not 
begin to affect American charity in any significant way until after the 
institution of federal income tax in 1913.200 The American legal 
system's confusion about charity was evident significantly earlier. 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, state courts across the country 
expressed disagreement over the proper legal definition of charity.201 
Some, hewing to the vulgar conception, held that charity was 
"whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love of your 
neighbor, in the Catholic and universal sense-given from these 
motives, and to those ends, free from the stain or taint of every 
consideration that is personal, private, or selfish."202 Others insisted 
that a donor's motivation for giving was irrelevant, and that the 
proper legal definition of charity, in the tradition of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses and the English common law, depended on whether 
the gift in question was for the benefit of the general public and eased 
burdens on government.203 
Echoing the problems that contemporary charities face, state courts 
in that day disagreed over what should happen when purported 
charities produced earned income. Numerous cases assessed the 
198. Fishman, supra note 4, at 618; Gary N. Scrivner, 100 Years of Tax Policy 
Changes Affecting Charitable Organizations, in The Nonprofit Organization: 
Essential Readings, supra note 13, at 126. 
199. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 90 (arguing that Congress itself was confused 
over what it meant by "charitable" when it passed charitable tax legislation). 
200. See infra Part 11.B for a discussion of early federal tax laws. 
201. Most of these cases arose in the trust law context or in cases in which 
organizations were seeking property tax abatements based on their purportedly 
charitable status. 
202. See supra note 2; see also Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 199 N.Y.S. 369, 372 
(App. Div. 1923). 
203. See, e.g., Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 A. 553, 555-56 (Pa. 1888). 
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charitable status of poorhouses, workhouses, and convalescent homes 
that required residents to engage in profit-generating labor to defray 
the organizations' operating expenses. Some state courts had no 
trouble finding such organizations charitable204 even where the 
commercial activities were substantial and funds went to the pay the 
salaries of staff members.205 Other courts examining similar 
organizations assigned charitable status only if they found that the 
organizations did not use the commercially generated fees to pay 
salaries for the organization's employees,206 or that the fee-generating 
activity was merely "incidental to the organization's charitable 
mission. "207 
Similarly, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
courts around the country grappled with whether organizations like 
schools and hospitals that accepted or demanded fees from the 
beneficiaries of their services could be considered charitable. Some 
courts found that schools could charge tuition and remain charitable 
so long as the fees did not amount to any more than "self-support" for 
the institution.208 Others required more stringent proof of charitable 
purpose from fee-generating organizations, for example, that the 
organizations consistently lost money in spite of collecting fees.209 Still 
others rejected charitable status for fee-generating institutions, often 
relying on vague rationales such as "the fees charged [were] very 
considerable,"210 or conclusory statements that the organization in 
question had "a commercial aspect."211 
In short, cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that wrestled with the legal definition of charity reveal 
ambiguity and uncertainty. Results seem to be determined by the 
predilections of the examining judges and whether or not they 
believed that the organizations in question looked and felt charitable 
given their particular conceptions of the meaning and role of charity. 
204. See, e.g., House of Refuge v. Smith, 21 A. 353,353 (Pa. 1891). 
205. See Paterson Rescue Mission v. High, 44 A. 974,976 (N.J. 1899). 
206. See, e.g., House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v. Bd. of Equalization (In re 
House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha), 203 N.W. 632,634 (Neb. 1925). 
207. Contributors to Pa. Hosp. v. Delaware County, 32 A. 456, 457 (Pa. 1895); see 
also Franklin Square House v. City of Boston, 74 N.E. 675 (Mass. 1905). 
208. State ex rel. Cunningham v. Bd. of Assessors of Parish of Orleans, 26 So. 872, 
875 (La. 1898); Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 57 
(Pa. 1892); see also Santa Rosa Infirmary v. San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926, 936 (Tex. 
1924). 
209. Trs. of Ky. Female Orphan Sch. v. City of Louisville, 36 S.W. 921, 924 (Ky. 
1896) (relying on the fact that charges were "incidental"); Bd. of Comm'rs of Tulsa 
County v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother, 283 P. 984, 985 (Okla. 1930). 
210. Bancroft Sch. v. State Bd. of Taxes and Assessment, 60 A. 390, 391 (N.J. 
1932); see also Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Bd. of Assessors, 1 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Mass. 
1936) (rejecting charitable status for symphony partly on grounds that it charged too 
much for tickets); Dwight Sch. of Englewood v. State Bd. of Tax Appeais, 177 A. 875, 
877 (N.J. 1935) (finding teachers' salaries too high and school profits too great). 
211. Bancroft, 160 A. at 391. 
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Some cases showed a preference for charity as compassion, holding to 
the view that an act must spring from Christian love and be directed at 
the relief of suffering if it were to enjoy the legal advantages of 
charitable status. Others implicitly or explicitly approved of charity as 
social engineering in which charitable recipients could be compelled 
to work for their keep and where commerce was a legitimate tool for 
accomplishing socially desirable ends. 
B. Confusion in the Early Federal Tax Law Definition of Charity 
In the late 1800s, as state courts around the country were wrestling 
awkwardly and inconsistently with the legal conception of charity, the 
center of gravity of charity law began to shift toward the federal 
government. The transition began with the federal government's 
efforts to impose the country's first income taxes and, along with the 
income tax laws, the country's first charitable tax exemptions. If the 
transition from state to federal law presented an opportunity to clarify 
our country's uncertain legal understanding of charity, that 
opportunity was missed. 
The Tariff Act of 1894, the first major piece of federal legislation 
that attempted to specify what types of organizations would be subject 
to federal taxation, exempted nonprofit charitable, religious, and 
educational organizations and provided for a corporate income tax 
deduction for donations to charitable entities.212 Although the 1894 
Act was overturned on constitutional grounds, similar legislation was 
passed in 1913 after the implementation of the 16th Amendment.213 
Setting a pattern of uncertainty, the legislative committee reports that 
accompanied the 1913 Act revealed little about Congress's 
motivations for exempting charitable organizations from taxation, or 
about what it considered to be charitable.214 
Bruce Hopkins offers two related arguments to support an assertion 
that Congress, from the time it first passed the charitable tax 
exemption until quite recently, intended to use the word "charity" in 
its vulgar sense. His first argument is one of common-sense statutory 
construction. The early tax codes' description of tax-exempt 
organizations always used the terms "charitable, religious, or 
educational." If Congress had intended the word "charitable" to be 
understood in its broad, English common law, social engineering 
sense, it would not have made sense to enumerate the other types of 
organizations (religious or educational), because the common law 
definition was more than broad enough to subsume them. It thus 
212. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 556; see Scrivner, supra note 198, at 
126. 
213. Scrivner, supra note 198, at 127. 
214. Id. 
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stands to reason that Congress was using the term charity in its vulgar, 
narrower sense of aiding the poor.215 
Hopkins's statutory construction argument is buttressed by 
subsequent legislative history. Through the early and mid-twentieth 
century, each new revision of the Revenue Act contained a provision 
that included the charitable tax exemption-the provisions that later 
became known by the Code section that contained them, 501(c)(3). 
With each revision, the regulations that accompanied the acts 
consistently defined charity as "relief of the poor."216 For example, 
during the fifteen years that the Revenue Act of 1939 was in effect, 
the IRS issued three separate sets of regulations, and each of them 
defined the term charitable in its vulgar sense.217 When Congress 
passed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, (which was when the 
charitable tax exemption provisions first were gathered in section 
501), an accompanying report of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means commented that "[n]o change in substance has been made."218 
Thus, at the adoption of section 501 of the Code in 1954, the popular 
a_nd ordinary, or vulgar, meaning of the term charitable governed the 
definition of that word for federal tax purposes.219 
However, by the time the IRS regulations to the 1954 Act appeared 
in 1959, the IRS, without the approval of Congress, had vastly 
expanded the federal tax definition of charitable. Those regulations 
defined it 
in its generally accepted legal sense, [m]eaning [r]elief of poor and 
distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; 
advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of 
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of 
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations 
designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen 
neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and 
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; 
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile 
delinquency.220 
215. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 90. The obvious practical result of this narrower 
definition would be that socially beneficial organizations would not qualify for tax 
exemption unless they benefit the poor and needy, are religious, or educational. 
Indeed, early administrative decisions by the IRS indicate that this was their view. 
See, e.g., I.T. 1800, 2-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923). 
216. See, e.g., Treas Reg. § 19.101(6)-1 (1938); Treas. Reg. 94, art. 101(6)-1 (1936); 
Treas. Reg. 69, art. 517 (1926); Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517 (1924); see also, Hopkins, supra 
note 2, at 91. 
217. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 91. 
218. Internal Revenue Code, ch. 736, 68 Stat. 163, 163 (current version at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501 (2000)); Hopkins, supra note 2, at 91 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess., at 165 (1954), 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017). 
219. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 91. 
220. Treas Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
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Suddenly, with the issuance of this language, it appeared that aiding 
the poor was only one meaning of charitable. For federal tax 
purposes, the English common law notions of charity-including ideas 
about social engineering through finding work for the needy-
counted. 221 
The 1959 IRS regulations adopted a definition of charity that 
apparently was at odds with what Congress intended, but because 
Congress never took action to reign in the expanded legal definition, 
it became accepted doctrine with the passage of time and is the legal 
definition of charity that we live with today.222 As to why Congress 
remained silent, we simply do not know. 
What we do know is that Congress's inaction left us with a legal 
definition broad enough (one might say vague enough)223 to 
encompass all of the diverse meanings of charity that had come down 
through the Anglo-American cultural and legal tradition. It is this 
vague definition that has led in our day to confused and contradictory 
court cases and legal doctrines.224 In recent times, as the trends 
toward social entrepreneurship and venture philanthropy have 
accelerated,225 and as the bounds between for-profit and nonprofit 
enterprises have blurred, our vague, ill-discussed, ill-defined legal 
definition of charity has been too amorphous to lend structure to the 
difficult task of sorting out what is and is not charitable in the eyes of 
the law. The result has been the piecemeal, ad hoc development of 
the unworkable, often inconsistent legal doctrines discussed below. 
C. Confusion in Contemporary Legal Doctrines Governing American 
Charity 
Lacking a specific, workable definition of charity, federal tax law 
has developed a series of tests and doctrines to help it determine 
which activities and organizations should qualify for charitable tax 
exemption and which should not. These tests include the operational 
test, the commerciality doctrine, UBIT, and the commensurate-in-
scope doctrine. When today's entrepreneurial charities find 
themselves caught in the double bind described in the introduction to 
this Article, their legal problems often stem from some combination 
of these. Although it is possible to devise a conceptual framework 
that separates and to a large extent harmonizes the doctrines, in 
practice the IRS and examining courts apply them interchangeably 
221. Id. 
222. Id.; Hopkins, supra note 2, at 92. 
223. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 92 (arguing that today's legal definition of 
charity is unmanageably broad); see also Tommy F. Thompson, The 
Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects and 
Remedies, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 13-14 (1985). 
224. See supra Parts 11.A-B. 
225. See supra Part I.D. 
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and inconsistently, such that contemporary entrepreneurial charities-
even those with sophisticated legal counsel-cannot confidently 
navigate them. The discussion below briefly summarizes the doctrines 
and explains why together they constitute a murky legal swamp. 
1. The Operational Test 
The first significant legal step for a charitable organization wishing 
to obtain exemption from federal income taxation is to pass the IRS's 
operational test.226 It can be an exacting test, and it is the first place 
that many new organizations, particularly those with an 
entrepreneurial bent, become mired in the confusing American law of 
charity. 
The operational test requires that an "organization's resources must 
be devoted to purposes that qualify as exclusively charitable within 
the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the [IRS] Code and the applicable 
regulations."227 The word "exclusively" in the statute is interpreted by 
IRS regulations to mean "primarily" or "substantially,"228 so that an 
aspiring charity will fail the operational test if more than an 
insubstantial part of its activities are not in furtherance of its 
charitable purpose.229 There are certain common non-charitable 
activities that cause aspiring or existing charities to fail the operational 
test; for example, because they pay profits to insiders, devote their 
services to a too-narrow class of beneficiaries, or engage in 
inappropriate amounts of lobbying or in political campaigning.230 
More relevant for our purposes, the operational test also ensnares 
organizations that devote too much of their efforts to commercial 
rather than charitable activity. Given the burgeoning growth of 
commercial enterprise among charitable organizations,231 it should not 
be surprising that the operational test has become a problem for many 
organizations.232 
For all the vagaries of the operational test, discussed below, it 
clearly does permit charities to engage in some degree of commercial 
activity. The vexing question is, "How much?" Section 501(c)(3) of 
the Code neither states nor implies anything about the permissible 
226. See Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(a)-(b). Aspiring charities must also pass the 
IRS's "organizational test," which is, in essence, a "magic words" test. The applying 
organization merely must show that certain clauses-promising to eschew lobbying 
and political activity and all private inurement, for example-have been included in 
the organization's founding documents. Id. 
227. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 66 (citing Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245). 
228. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l); see Colombo, supra note 183, at 495-96. 
229. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l); Hopkins, supra note 2, at 66. 
230. See Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2)-(3). 
231. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
232. Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1861 (arguing the operational test is being 
used by the IRS "to challenge troublesome amounts of commercial activity in 
charities"). 
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bounds of charities' commercial activities. The related Treasury 
Regulations, however, reveal the law's supposed tolerance for profit 
making. 
Treasury Regulation section l.501(c)(3)-l(e), concerns 
"[o]rganizations carrying on trade or business," which for our 
purposes can be taken as synonymous with commercial activity. It 
begins with unambiguous language stating that: 
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) 
although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its 
activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance 
of the exempt organization's exempt purpose or purposes and if the 
organization is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of 
carrying on an unrelated trade or business .... 233 
Stated otherwise, a charity may operate a trade or business that is in 
furtherance of its charitable purpose to whatever extent it pleases 
without violating the operational test. If, however, the charity 
engages in trade or business that is not in furtherance of its exempt 
purpose and if that trade or business becomes the primary purpose of 
the organization, it will lose its charitable, tax-exempt status.234 
It is important to emphasize that by the terms of the operational 
test regulations, the analysis of a charity's commercial activity should 
focus on the purpose of that activity, not its nature.235 Thus, it should 
not matter that a charity serving the blind is fabricating and selling 
light bulbs to the public at a profit ( a description of the commercial 
nature of the activity) if that activity is intended to provide training 
and employment to blind people ( a description of the activity's 
purpose ).236 
In sum, if one believes the wording of the regulations, the 
application of the operational test to charities engaged in commercial 
activities should be straightforward: First, identify which commercial 
activities are in furtherance of the organization's charitable purposes; 
second, make sure that those commercial activities not in furtherance 
of the charitable purposes are not the organization's primary 
purpose.237 
233. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(e). 
234. Id.; see Colombo, supra note 183, at 497; Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1864. 
The confusion of navigating the charity doctrines is compounded by the fact that 
these doctrines use inconsistent language. The operational test asks if a given activity 
is "in furtherance of" the organization's charitable purpose. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-
l(e). On the other hand, determining whether UBIT applies to commercial charities 
turns on whether the activity is "related to" the organization's charitable purpose. 
Conventional thinking is that the differently named concepts mean essentially the 
same thing. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 646. 
235. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(e)(l). 
236. Id; see Bradley Meyers, Revisiting the Commerciality Doctrine, 10 J. 
Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L.134, 136 (2001). 
237. Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(e )(1); see Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1865. 
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But what appears simple in the regulation has become muddled in 
the execution. For unknown reasons (though I will speculate in Part 
II.C.5, below) the IRS eschews the obvious two-part inquiry, and 
instead employs a "subjective 'facts-and-circumstances' standard" to 
determine whether a charity flunks the operational test due to 
commercial activity.238 Under this broad facts-and-circumstances 
inquiry, the analysis deteriorates into an unprincipled, unpredictable 
test that amounts to an examination of whether the organization 
"smell[s] like" a charity to whomever is inquiring.239 
The IRS and courts applying the operational test to commercial 
activity by charities also routinely ignore the distinction between 
examining the nature of the activity and the purpose of the activity. 
One of the seminal court decisions in this area, B.S. W. Group, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, explained the law correctly, saying that it is the 
"purpose towards which an organization's activities are directed, and 
not the nature of the activities themselves, [that are] ultimately 
dispositive of the organization's right to be classified as a section 
501(c)(3) organization."240 However, many other courts241 and the 
IRS itself242 routinely confuse the analysis and focus on the nature of 
the activities (whether they look and feel inappropriately 
commercial), ignoring the question of whether the activities are 
related to the organizations' charitable purposes. More often than 
not, examining authorities launch into a facts-and-circumstances test 
whenever an organization engages in commercial activity of any 
kind.243 When this happens, the determination of charitable status 
under the operational test becomes as untethered and ad hoc as the 
muddled state court decisions that determined the legal bounds of 
charity at the end of the nineteenth century.244 
238. Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1865. 
239. Id. 
240. B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57 (1978). 
241. See, e.g., Nonprofits' Ins. Alliance of Cal. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 277, 293 
(1994) (upholding denial of tax exemption to organization that provided insurance to 
nonprofits); Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 352, 361 
(1983) (upholding denial of exemption where church offered medical plan to 
congregation members only) rev'd, 746 F.2d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1984) (ruling the 
Tax Court should have inquired whether medical plan furthered the church's exempt 
purposes); Copyright Clearance Ctr. v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 793, 803 (1982) (finding 
nonexempt purpose but failing to analyze organization's charitable purposes); see also 
Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1870. 
242. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1883. These student commentators argue 
that while the IRS formally asserts that it adheres to the judicially created facts-and-
circumstances test to determine whether or not a charity is engaging in substantial 
amounts of unrelated commerce in violation of the operational test, its administrative 
rulings have rarely involved this analysis. In practice, the IRS generally makes 
determinations in a conclusory manner, offering minimal rationale and often simply 
bypassing the inquiry all together. Id. at 1884. 
243. See id. at 1871. 
244. See supra Part II.A. 
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Why is this area of law beset by such doctrinal confusion? One 
answer is that judges and administrative authorities have difficulty 
pinpointing what qualifies as "in furtherance of" a legitimate 
charitable purpose because there is no precise, widely accepted view 
of what the law means by charity. Had Congress stuck to the original 
definition contained in the earliest federal charitable exemption 
provisions, relief of the poor, it would have been comparatively simple 
for judges to determine which commercial activities did and did not 
qualify as "in furtherance of." Instead, we have inherited the 
definition of charity laid out in Treasury Regulation section 
l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2), which includes within its ambit not only religion 
and education but such hazy concepts as the "lessening of the burdens 
of Government," and the "promotion of social welfare." This makes 
it extremely difficult for judges and regulators and for charities 
themselves to make meaningful, legally recognizable distinctions 
between commercial activity that is and is not in furtherance of a 
charitable purpose.245 
There is another more speculative, but perhaps more compelling, 
explanation of why judges and administrators wield the wet noodle of 
the facts-and-circumstances test when called upon to distinguish 
between charitable and non-charitable organizations under the 
operational test. That explanation, which draws upon the historical 
tradition of Anglo-American charity, will be laid out in more detail in 
Part 11.C.5 below. 
2. The Commerciality Doctrine 
The commerciality doctrine is so vague and malleable that it strains 
the bounds of legal rhetoric to call it a doctrine.246 However, this 
particular doctrine ( or non-doctrine) wreaks havoc in the world of 
entrepreneurial charities, and since it is difficult to critique a doctrine 
that completely lacks substance, we must attempt to sketch its 
contours and explain its application. 
By way of definition, Hopkins offers the following gossamer 
explanation of commerciality: 
A tax-exempt organization is engaged in a nonexempt activity when 
that activity is engaged in a manner that is considered commercial. 
An act is a commercial one if it has a direct counterpart in, or is 
245. See Thompson, supra note 223, at 12-13. 
246. This footnote is intended for readers familiar with the Harry Potter series of 
novels. I explain the commerciality doctrine to my law students by likening it to the 
bludger in a game of quiddich. The bludger is a small, hard ball that flies through the 
air knocking players off their broomsticks when they are concentrating on other 
aspects of the game. Like the commerciality doctrine, the bludger produces anxiety in 
players because it is absolutely unpredictable: No one knows when it will strike and 
what kind of damage it will cause. See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's 
Stone (1999). 
2005] REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY 2477 
conducted in the same manner as is the case in the realm of for-
profit organizations.247 
If that description of the doctrine's ambit sounds familiar, it is 
because we just completed a discussion of the operational test, which, 
in the context of charitable organizations that engage in commercial 
activities, can cover much the same ground. The two doctrines can be 
conceptually harmonized if one considers the commerciality doctrine 
as a subset of the operational test. That is, when a court or the IRS 
applies the operational test to determine whether a charity engages in 
more than an "insubstantial amount" of non-charitable activity, and if 
the non-charitable activity in question is commercial activity unrelated 
to the organization's mission (as opposed to, say, lobbying), then the 
examining authority will apply the commerciality doctrine. 
Life for entrepreneurial charities would be easier if courts and the 
IRS consistently applied the operational test and the commerciality 
doctrine in this way, but alas they do not. In practice, courts and the 
IRS sometimes assess commercial activity using the rubric of the 
operational test without ever mentioning the commerciality doctrine; 
others do the opposite, and a few actually mention both and attempt 
to describe the connection between the two.248 
Forced to grapple with such a slippery doctrine, the first instinct of a 
lawyer representing an entrepreneurial charity would be to examine 
the words of the statute from whence it came. In this case, however, 
the examination would prove fruitless, as the doctrine grew out of 
"loose language in court opinions, which in tum seem to have 
reflected judges' personal views as to what the law ought to be (rather 
than what it is)."249 
The first whispers of commerciality appeared in the 1924 case 
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores de la Provincia def 
Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas,250 in which the Supreme Court 
grappled with whether a religious order could be considered 
charitable and thus exempt from federal income taxation where the 
order produced revenue through real estate and stock investments as 
well as through the limited sale of commercial products such as 
chocolate and wine.251 The IRS, arguing before the development of 
today's operational test, contended that the religious order was 
maintained for "business and commercial purposes," and therefore 
should have its charitable tax exemption revoked.252 The Court 
rejected this argument, relying vaguely on the rationale that the 
organization was not engaged in "competition" with for-profit firms, 
247. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 629-30. 
248. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 497. 
249. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 633; see also Meyers, supra note 236, at 134. 
250. 263 U.S. 578 (1924). 
251. Id. at 580-81. 
252. Id. at 581. 
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and that the profits that were generated by the various activities were 
a "negligible factor" in its overall funding. 253 From these seemingly 
innocuous statements, the commerciality doctrine was born.254 
The commerciality emanations from the U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion in Trinidad gave rise to a brief golden era in the development 
of commercial enterprises by charities. The presiding legal doctrine 
became known as the destination-of-income test, which held, in 
essence, that so long as an organization's commercial profits were 
destined to fund its charitable goals, its status as a tax-exempt charity 
was safe.255 Commercial "feeder organizations" sprang up that 
generated commercial profits and then fed these profits directly to 
their parent charities. Until they were reigned in, charitable 
organizations felt free to run businesses that were completely 
unrelated to their charitable missions, and whose profits supported 
their charitable work. The most notorious of these was the Mueller 
Macaroni Company, which held a significant share of the United 
States macaroni market, but which generated all of its profits tax-free 
because it was owned by and fed its earnings to New York University 
School of Law.256 
A little more than twenty years after Trinidad, the Court applied 
the commerciality doctrine in a way that called into question the 
viability of the destination-of-income test. In Better Business Bureau 
v. United States,257 the Court was asked to determine whether the 
Better Business Bureau qualified for exemption as an educational 
organization. The Court stated that the "exclusivity" requirement of 
section 501(c)(3) of the Code "plainly means that the presence of a 
single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy 
the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly 
educational purposes."258 It concluded that although most of the 
Better Business Bureau's activities were indeed educational-
teaching merchants about ethical business practices, for example-its 
goal of promoting a profitable local business community was 
noneducational, that the organization therefore could be said to have 
a "commercial hue," and that its "activities [were] largely animated by 
this commercial purpose. "259 
In the years before and after the Better Business Bureau decision, 
there was confusion over how much, if any, commercial activity 
charities could permissibly engage in. Some rulings applied the 
253. Id. at 582. 
254. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 634; Colombo, supra note 183, at 497-98. 
255. See Meyers, supra note 236, at 136. 
256. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 479 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding denial 
of tax exemption for macaroni profits). 
257. 326 U.S. 279 (1945). 
258. Id. at 283. 
259. Id. at 283-84; see also Hopkins, supra note 2, at 635; Colombo, supra note 183, 
at 499. 
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destination-of-income test260 while others grappled awkwardly with 
Better Business Bureau's "commercial hue" concept.261 Attempts to 
clarify the field came in two forms. First, in 1950 Congress passed 
UBIT, which eliminated the destination-of-income test and began 
taxing commercial activity that was unrelated to exempt 
organizations' charitable purposes. Second, federal courts handed 
down a series of decisions that put teeth, if not predictability, into the 
commerciality doctrine. We will examine the further development of 
the commerciality doctrine directly below, and then tum in Part 11.C.3 
to a description of UBIT and its effects. 
In the 1960s, the IRS and courts began regularly applying the 
commerciality doctrine, striking fear into the hearts of fee-generating 
charities.262 The vagaries of the doctrine were revealed in a line of 
cases focusing on nonprofit religious publishing organizations. The 
first, Scripture Press Foundation v. United States,263 involved an 
organization that published and sold religious texts with the aim of 
improving the quality of Protestant Sunday school instruction.264 The 
organization became highly successful and accumulated more than 
$1.6 million in profits, an amount the IRS found unacceptable and the 
court agreed was "very substantial."265 The court concluded that the 
large profits furnished "some evidence indicative of a commercial 
character."266 The court also found it significant that Scripture 
conducted its business in a manner similar to for-profit religious 
publishers, and engaged only in an "incidental" amount of activity 
that was purely religious.267 The court never discussed whether the 
profit-generating activity at issue was related or unrelated to the 
organization's charitable purpose, as the operational test would have 
dictated.268 The court simply found, based on all the circumstances, 
that the organization was too commercial, and revoked its federal tax 
exemption. 
There followed a series of commerciality cases focusing mainly on 
nonprofit publishers.269 By the time that string of cases ran its course, 
260. See, e.g., Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938) 
(finding a corporate owner of beach property exempt where profits support a 
charitable foundation). 
261. See infra notes 270, 275-82 and accompanying text. 
262. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 501. 
263. 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
264. Id. at 803. 
265. Id. at 804. 
266. Id. at 803. 
267. Id. at 805-06 & n. 11. 
268. See supra Part 11.C.l. 
269. See, e.g., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D. Mass. 
1968) (a publisher lost exemption where it conducted itself like a for-profit publisher 
and "clearly engaged primarily in a business activity") rev'd, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 
1969) (on grounds that the organization was not excessively commercial where it did 
not produce operating profits); Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 
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it seemed clear that courts and the IRS were going to ignore the 
question that was demanded by IRS regulations, namely whether a 
given organization's profits were in furtherance of its charitable 
mission, and instead would decide commerciality cases based on a 
loose and variable determination of whether the organization in 
question had an impermissible commercial hue. Given the range of 
rationales and outcomes, it was impossible to nail down exactly what 
added up to a commercial hue, but factors included: (1) whether the 
organization at issue was producing substantial overall profits, (2) 
whether the organization was setting prices at or below the level of 
commercial firms, and (3) whether the organization was acting in 
direct competition with for-profit companies.270 
In a more recent, much discussed case, the U.S. Tax Court agreed 
with the denial of exemption for a purportedly charitable and 
religious entity affiliated with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church that, 
as part of its church mission, maintained vegetarian restaurants and 
health food stores.271 The court denied exemption on grounds that the 
activities were conducted as a business and that the organization was 
in competition with other restaurants and health food stores.272 On 
appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
tax court opinion, finding that the organization violated the 
commerciality doctrine by: (1) selling goods and services to the 
general public; (2) engaging in direct competition with commercial 
stores and restaurants; (3) setting prices based on formulas common in 
the retail food business rather than below cost; (4) using promotional 
materials to increase sales; (5) maintaining regular business hours of 
operation; (6) paying professionals to run the operations rather than 
relying on volunteers; and (7) failing to elicit charitable 
contributions.273 As in previous commerciality doctrine cases,274 the 
court provided scant guidance as to how to determine whether a 
924 (N.D. Ind. 1967) (publication and sale of religious literature not exempt or 
charitable where the commercial activity (i.e., the sale of literature) was its sole 
activity; no mention of relatedness); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 
719 (1964) (religious organization that conducts training projects found tax exempt 
based on fact that it does not generate profits; no discussion of relatedness); Am. Inst. 
for Econ. Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (an organization that 
sells newsletters and books to subscribers containing investment advice is not 
charitable or educational because it competes with for-profit companies and its 
purpose is "primarily business"; no discussion of whether the profit-making activity 
was related or unrelated to the charitable mission). 
270. See supra note 269; see also Colombo, supra note 183, at 502. 
271. Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 710 {1990), affd, 950 F.2d 365 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
272. Id. at 713. 
273. Living Faith, Inc., 950 F.2d at 374-75. 
274. See, e.g., B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352 {1978) {finding, 
purportedly under the operational test but actually under the commerciality doctrine, 
that an organization providing consulting services to nonprofits engaged in rural 
policy and program development had a "commercial hue"). 
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substantial unrelated purpose existed, which facts should be taken 
into account, and what weight the different facts should be accorded. 
Once again, the court failed entirely to consider whether the 
commercial activities in question were in furtherance of the 
organization's charitable purpose and thus permissible under the 
operational test. 
The commerciality doctrine, with its evaluation of charities' 
commercial hue, is still very much alive, but neither the courts nor the 
IRS apply it consistently.275 In 1984, for example, the Third Circuit 
reversed the revocation of exempt status for a religious publisher on 
facts very similar to Scripture Press.276 The tax court had upheld the 
IRS's determination that the organization operated with an 
impermissible commercial hue, based largely on its significant 
profits.277 The Third Circuit reversed, stating that "success in terms of 
audience reached and influence exerted, in and of itself, should not 
jeopardize the tax-exempt status of organizations which remain true 
to their stated goals."278 Apparently, the Third Circuit correctly took 
into consideration that the organization's commercial activities were 
related to its charitable purpose.279 
In several other cases, the tax court itself has seemingly 
contradicted its own jurisprudence by finding commercial charities 
exempt from taxation. For example, it was called upon to determine 
whether an exempt organization that imported and sold artisans' 
crafts could be tax exempt. The IRS contended that the organization 
was a commercial import firm. 280 The organization countered that its 
charitable purpose was, among other things, to help disadvantaged 
artisans in poverty-stricken countries subsist and preserve their 
craft.281 The tax court agreed with the organization, finding that it 
engaged in the fee-generating activities not as an end in themselves 
but as a means of accomplishing legitimate exempt purposes.282 
From the perspective of a fee-generating, entrepreneurial charity, 
this and similar cases283 were laudable but hardly comforting since it is 
impossible to see in them grounds for a factual or legal distinction 
from opposing cases, other than that our courts and administrative 
275. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 503. 
276. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984). 
277. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 1070, 1088-89 (1982). 
278. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d at 158. 
279. See id. at 158-59. 
280. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202,208 (1978). 
281. Id. at 207-08. 
282. Id. at 214; see Hopkins, supra note 2, at 638. 
283. See, e.g., Indus. Aid for the Blind v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 96 (1979) (finding an 
organization exempt in spite of profit generation where the organization's purpose 
was to purchase and sell products manufactured by blind individuals). 
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agencies like poor artisans and do not like comparatively wealthy 
consultants and religious book publishers.284 
This brings us back to the quandary introduced at the start Part 
11.C.2: How can modem, entrepreneurial charities comply with a 
doctrine that sprang from the ether and seems to change every time it 
is applied, a doctrine that crept into American charity law through 
judges' inchoate sense that commercial activity is incompatible with 
tax-exempt status, even though governing statutes and regulations 
appear to provide the opposite? Judges and administrators apply the 
doctrine ad hoc, taking into account whatever facts they think are 
relevant, and seemingly making judgments based on how appealing 
they find the charitable missions of the organizations in question.285 
Charities subject to the doctrine find themselves in the position of 
having to guess how much profit they are allowed to generate before 
jeopardizing their tax-exempt status.286 As discussed in Part 11.C.5 
below, this schizophrenic doctrine's existence might best be explained 
by the schizophrenic Anglo-American definition of charity, and the 
most effective cure may be a revision of that definition. 
284. For purposes of my argument, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the 
commerciality doctrine is vague and inconsistently applied. However, I do not want 
to move on without at least mentioning that there are serious logical flaws embedded 
within it. First, at its most general level the doctrine poses this nonsensical question: 
Does the commercial activity in question have a commercial hue? Given that the 
analysis begins with the identification of commercial conduct, it is difficult to fathom 
how confirmation that the activity is indeed commercial moves the inquiry in a 
meaningful direction or can furnish the basis of a principled judgment. Moreover, the 
doctrine seems downright silly when it holds that profit generation is a key factor 
weighing against tax-exempt status when charities' sole motivation for engaging in 
commercial activity obviously is to generate revenue. Why else would they do it? 
Finally, there is a serious logical flaw in the commerciality doctrine's mushy and ill-
defined analysis of competition and the cost of services. On one hand, courts frown 
on exempt organizations that compete with commercial ventures. Market 
competition is (or at least was) considered to be strong evidence of nonexempt 
commercial purposes. See, e.g., Fed'n Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r 72 T.C. 687,692 
{1979); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978). On the other hand, 
courts favor organizations that charge fees that are below cost, viewing this as 
evidence that the activities are being conducted for charitable purposes, not solely for 
profit. See Peoples Transl. Serv./Newsfront Int'! v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 42, 49 (1979); see 
also Rev. Rul 68-306, 1968-1 C.B. 257 {granting exemption to a newspaper publisher 
whose subscription was not enough to cover costs of the operation). The interplay of 
these two factors puts charities in a no-win situation. They are expected to avoid 
competing with for-profit businesses offering similar goods or services, yet they are 
required to price their goods at discount rates to prove they are charitable. See 
generally Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1873-76. 
285. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1869. 
286. See, e.g., Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961); 
see also Colombo, supra note 183, at 504-05. 
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3. Unrelated Business Income Tax 
The unrelated business income tax is another perplexing doctrine 
that has evolved amidst our society's divided understanding of charity. 
In 1950, Congress passed UBIT to prevent nonprofit charities from 
engaging in unfair competition with for-profit enterprises. In 
Congress's view, formulated under heavy lobbying from small 
business interests,287 the permissive income generation rules for 
charity that had arisen as a result of the Trinidad decision, including 
the destination-of-income test that allowed charities to engage in 
practically unlimited commercial activity,288 also had permitted them 
to compete unfairly with for-profit enterprises. Whether or not 
commercial competition by charities is truly unfair,289 Congress took 
action by adding the UBIT provision to the IRS Code. 
The idea behind the passage of UBIT was that instead of banning 
all commercial activity carried on by charities, Congress would force 
them to compete fairly in the marketplace by taxing at normal 
corporate rates all of their profits resulting from trade or business that 
was not "substantially related" to the performance of their exempt 
purposes.290 In theory, charities would continue to be free to engage 
in commercial activities related to their exempt purposes, although, as 
discussed in Part 11.C.2 above, the commerciality doctrine has 
rendered that assumption dangerous. 
More precisely, according to IRS regulations a charity's income is 
subject to UBIT when: (1) the income at issue results from a trade or 
business; (2) the trade or business is regularly carried on by the 
organization; and (3) the conduct of the trade or business is not 
substantially related to the performance by the organization of its tax-
exempt functions.291 Each of these three prongs is explained in pages 
of complicated regulations, which make difficult going for 
practitioners of nonprofit law and excellent material for law school 
essay exams. The Code and regulations also outline several important 
exceptions to UBIT, providing, for example, that income that 
otherwise would be treated as unrelated is not taxed when it results 
from business conducted by volunteers,292 when it is conducted for the 
convenience of the organization's members, students, patients, 
officers or employees,293 and when it results from thrift store sales.294 
287. See Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 77th Cong. 1612 (1942) [hereinafter Revenue Revision]; Colombo, supra 
note 183, at 529; Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business 
Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605 (1989). 
288. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text. 
289. See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text. 
290. I.RC.§ 513(a) (2000); Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-l(a) (as amended in 1983). 
291. Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-l(a). 
292. I.RC. § 513(a)(l). 
293. I.RC. § 513(a)(2). 
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By carefully navigating the statutory exceptions and UBIT case law, 
skillful attorneys and their savvy nonprofit clients have learned to 
structure business operations to minimize and in most cases avoid 
UBIT payments.295 Interesting though they are, we will not spend 
time exploring the intricacies of UBIT or charities' creative 
countermeasures. Instead, we will confine our discussion to the 
confusing ways it influences and interacts with the operational test 
and the commerciality doctrine. 
Although it is possible to draw logical connections between UBIT 
and the operational test and commerciality doctrine, neither the IRS 
nor the courts have defined how they interact.296 Congress's adoption 
of UBIT logically implied that it accepted that charities would engage 
in commercial activities unrelated to ( or, in the parlance of the 
operational test, not in furtherance of) their exempt purposes, and 
that those activities would be compatible with organizations' tax-
exempt status under the operational test, so long as their primary 
purposes remained charitable.297 However, the doctrines have never 
been harmonized officially, and charities still cannot predict when 
judges or administrators will choose to tax their income under UBIT 
rather than attack their tax exemptions under the operational test or 
the commerciality doctrine. 
At least some of the confusion surrounding the doctrines stems 
from the fact that the determination of whether a charity must pay 
UBIT is evaluated based on whether its profit-generating activity is 
"related" to its exempt function. 298 The operational test, on the other 
hand, decides whether an organization can maintain its exempt status 
based on whether its "primary purpose" is charitable. The all-
important but vexing question for an entrepreneurial charity trying to 
navigate these doctrines is whether an income-generating activity can 
be "unrelated" to its exempt purpose and thus subject to UBIT, but at 
the same time not interfere with its primary purpose such that it can 
still pass the operational test.299 As discussed above, we know the 
general answer should be "yes, it is possible," because if deciding 
authorities were to rule that all unrelated commercial activity 
jeopardized tax-exempt status under the operational test, Congress's 
passage of UBIT would be rendered a nullity. 
294. I.RC.§ 513(a)(3). 
295. See John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of 
Their Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 Akron 
Tax J. 223, 272 (1996) (suggesting charitable organizations can avoid paying UBIT by 
regularly updating their mission statements to encompass their commercial activities). 
296. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1884. 
297. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l), -l(e)(l) (as amended in 1990). 
298. See I.RC.§ 5ll(a); Treas. Reg.§ 1.512(a)(l) (as amended in 2002). 
299. As discussed in Part 11.C.2, supra, an organization engaged in commercial 
activity that passes the operational test must under existing law still be wary of the 
commerciality doctrine. 
2005] REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY 2485 
How then should the doctrines be harmonized? Once an examining 
court or administrative authority has determined that a charity is 
engaged in an unrelated business activity, it should begin by taxing the 
profits under UBIT. It should then go on to determine under the 
operational test whether the unrelated commercial activity is so 
substantial that the organization's "primary purpose" has been 
compromised. Only if the answer to the latter question is affirmative 
should the authority disqualify the organization. 
Unfortunately, this is not how decision-making authorities have 
applied the doctrines. Although the IRS formally recognizes that 
there is a relationship between the operational test and UBIT,300 it 
routinely makes UBIT determinations without raising the question 
whether the charity should lose its exempt status under the 
operational test or the commerciality doctrine.301 Its consistent 
litigation strategy has been to present cases as either under the 
operational test, commerciality doctrine, or UBIT, such that courts 
rarely have the opportunity to consider the relationship between the 
doctrines and no case law has developed to guide entrepreneurial 
charities.302 As a result, there is no way for charities to know how 
much unrelated commercial activity they may engage in without 
jeopardizing their tax-exempt status. 
As was true when discussing the operational test and commerciality 
doctrine, the explanation of the confusion over UBIT and a solution 
to the problem may be found in the history of charity. 
4. The Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine 
In this incompatible patchwork of laws and regulations governing 
entrepreneurial charities, the commensurate-in-scope doctrine has 
evolved and is sometimes relied upon to fill in the practical and logical 
holes created by the other doctrines. We will confine our discussion 
of commensurate-in-scope to a f~w words. 
The commensurate-in-scope doctrine suggests that a key issue in 
determining if substantial unrelated business activity ( or, in terms of 
the operational test, substantial activity not in furtherance of the 
exempt purpose) is consistent with the organization's underlying 
exemption is whether the revenue from such commercial activity is 
spent to further the organization's charitable purpose.303 In other 
300. See Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 94-36-002 (Jan. 26, 1994). 
301. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1885; see, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 98-22-006 
(Jan. 29, 1998); Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 97-03-025 (Oct. 21, 1996); see also Carle Found. v. 
United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979) (IRS contending that pharmacy sales to 
the general public were unrelated business income to an exempt hospital without 
raising the question of whether unrelated sales might lead to loss of exemption). 
302. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 508; Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1883-84. 
303. See Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186-87 (introducing the doctrine in a matter 
involving a charity that derived revenues from unrelated rental income). 
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words, if the reviewing authority applying the doctrine finds that the 
organization's charitable program is "commensurate in scope" with its 
financial resources, it will uphold the organization's exemption even if 
the money is being produced through an activity that has nothing to 
do with the charitable mission. Although the doctrine was first 
enunciated in a 1964 Revenue Ruling,304 the IRS recently has been 
relying on it more frequently to determine whether charities that 
engage in commercial activities unrelated to their missions should lose 
their tax exemptions,305 and some commentators argue that the 
doctrine has begun to replace the primary purpose analysis of the 
operational test.306 
The rise of commensurate-in-scope is relevant to our historical 
analysis of charity law in two respects. First, it might offer a partial 
explanation of many of the seemingly inexplicable commerciality 
doctrine cases, even though it was never mentioned as grounds for 
these decisions.307 For example, in the Aid to Artisans, Inc . v. 
Commissioner case an organization that produced significant income 
from selling goods produced by poor artisans from other countries 
was permitted to keep its tax exemption where most of the profits 
being generated by the commercial activity were being ploughed back 
into the organization's charitable work.308 Similarly, in Industrial Aid 
for the Blind v. Commissioner, an organization that purchased and 
sold goods made by blind individuals was able to maintain its 
exemption where the facts indicated that most of the income went to 
fund the organization's charitable mission.309 In contrast, religious 
publishers such as Scripture Press that appeared to the court to be 
hoarding profits and paying employees high salaries without spending 
significant sums on activities that were traditionally charitable lost 
their exemptions.310 
Second, it is worth noting that the commensurate-in-scope doctrine 
appears to have much in common with the old destination-of-income 
test.311 Under both, courts and administrators seem to be comfortable 
saying that so long as the money is going to serve genuine charitable 
purposes, we do not really mind that it is being produced by unrelated 
commercial activity. The difference, of course, is that under the 
304. Id. 
305. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-21-056 (Feb. 8, 2000) (income from tearoom 
unrelated to charitable purpose is subject to UBIT but does not invalidate exempt 
status where profits were used to fund charitable activities); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-36-
001 (Jan. 4, 1995) (religious publisher is subject to UBIT but not loss of exemption 
where funds were used to support educational mission). 
306. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 75. 
307. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 513. 
308. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978). 
309. Indus. Aid for the Blind v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 96 (1979). 
310. Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
311. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
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destination-of-income test, the organization producing the income 
escaped taxation, whereas, under the combination of UBIT and the 
commensurate-in-scope doctrine, unrelated income is taxed at normal 
corporate rates. Still, both doctrines allow judges and administrators 
to do what they have been chafing to do since the earliest reported 
American legal decisions on charity: permit and even encourage 
commercial activities that support vulgar charity while squelching 
money-making activities that do not look and smell sufficiently 
charitable. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
From the beginning, American charity law has been premised on an 
inconsistent understanding of what charity means: aid to the poor 
based on indiscriminate compassion, or social engineering grounded 
in the Protestant work ethic. The division can be detected in the 
earliest state law decisions and throughout the development of the 
federal tax law pertaining to charity. 
This definitional uncertainty has led to contemporary legal 
doctrines that are vague and unworkable. Judges and administrators 
apply the closely related operational test and commerciality doctrine 
interchangeably to grant or revoke charitable exempt status based on 
an ever-shifting array of factors that seem to boil down to whether the 
mission and activities of the organization in question are appealing. 
Judges often find commercial activity unappealing and thus unlawful, 
particularly where the charity's mission focuses more on public benefit 
and social engineering than service to the poor. 
The commensurate-in-scope doctrine is sometimes (but sometimes 
not) applied in place of the operational test's "substantiality" 
determination. Its role appears to be to permit decision makers to 
approve of charitable status for commercial charities that have 
appealing missions and that spend most of their commercially raised 
funds on their charitable purposes. 
UBIT springs from a firm statutory base but adds to charities' 
confusion because no one can reliably predict where taxation under 
UBIT ends and revocation of exempt status under the operational test 
and commerciality doctrine begins. Further complicating the 
application of UBIT, many charities and judges have difficulty 
determining which activities are "substantially related" to their 
charitable purposes in a context where no one is quite sure what 
charity really means. From the perspective of charities, particularly 
entrepreneurial, income-generating charities, decision makers wield 
the law arbitrarily, limiting the entrepreneurial activities of charities 
that come before them based solely on their intuitive sense that 
commerce and charity are incompatible. 
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An explanation of the muddled American law of charity can be 
found in our history. Our cultural and legal definition of charity has 
evolved since the time of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I to encompass a 
broad array of socially-beneficial activities that have nothing to do 
with aiding the poor and needy. But in spite of that evolution, judges, 
administrators, and policymakers have never abandoned the older, 
stricter conception of charity as aid to the poor and distressed. 
Without articulating what they were doing, perhaps without even 
realizing it, American decision makers have consistently tugged the 
law back toward its vulgar roots. When a charitable organization 
today engages in what an administrator or judge feels is too much 
commerce-particularly where that organization combines commerce 
with a charitable mission that does not focus on aiding the poor and 
distressed-that administrator or judge will grasp for a legal 
mechanism to draw charity back toward its compassionate, Judeo-
Christian origins. 
But our federal tax law, which is now the de facto policing agency 
for most American charities,312 lacks a legal category or language to 
describe the sort of compassion-based, poverty-focused activity that 
comprises the roots of vulgar Anglo-American charity. Judges find 
themselves relying on vague and malleable legal doctrines such as 
commerciality, and vaporous legal tests such as "all the 
circumstances," to permit them to act on their intuitive beliefs that 
charity is about loving and serving the poor and distressed, regardless 
of what the IRS Code says about the permissibility of general "public 
benefit" and commercial activities.313 This exercise of judicial 
intuition makes for bad law. 
In the end, all that modern, entrepreneurial charities can garner 
from the confusing welter of doctrines that spring from our divided 
history of charity is that courts and the IRS will accept some measure 
of commercial activity, and that they are likely to permit more such 
activity if the charitable work of the organization at issue is 
appealingly vulgar, and if a high percentage of the funds being 
produced as a result of the commercial activity is being spent on the 
appealing charitable mission. Beyond that, charities can predict little. 
The IRS has on at least one occasion owned up to its part in the 
confusion. In a 1971 General Counsel's memorandum it declared: 
[F]or some time now it has been increasingly apparent that our 
earlier approach to the problem of permissibility or non-
permissibility of business activities of charities has been based on a 
misconception that somehow in the enactment of the provisions for 
exemptions of charities from income tax, Congress intended an 
312. See supra note 4. 
313. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 829 (arguing that judges take "intuitive offense" 
at the notion that a charity is doing something that more properly belongs in the 
domain of for-profit organizations); see also Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1868-69. 
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implied restriction on the extent of their engagement in business 
activities. In the years past, the Service sought by ruling and by 
litigation to deny the right of charities to engage in business, 
insisting that somewhere, somehow in the enactment of the 
exemption provisions Congress must have intended to limit the 
classification of exempt charities to those charities not engaged to 
any substantial extent in commercial endeavors.314 
These wise words could have added clarity to the government's 
regulation of charities, but they apparently were ignored by IRS 
litigators and courts, who continue, decades later, to challenge the 
notion that entrepreneurial, fee-generating organizations-especially 
those that do not serve the poor and distressed-can be charitable.315 
III. WHAT Is TO BE DONE? 
In Part I of this Article we saw that the Anglo-American cultural 
and legal definition of charity came to encompass two very different 
notions: aid to the poor on one hand and social engineering for the 
benefit of the general public on the other. The former insisted on 
compassionate help for those in need regardless of their worthiness 
while the latter emphasized the importance of work and held that the 
"sturdy poor" could justly be left to starve. Both understandings of 
charity persisted through the late Middle Ages, and were transferred 
to the New World. 
In Part II, we traced the development of the American law of 
charity and showed that its split definition led to inconsistent 
treatment in early case law, and, more recently, to incoherent federal 
legal standards. From our earliest history, charitable organizations 
have been pushed to engage in ever more social engineering and 
poverty management-often paying their own way by engaging in 
commercial activity-while judges and administrators, who have 
taken intuitive offense at this commercialization, have worked to tug 
charity back toward its compassionate, poverty-focused roots. The 
result has been confusion, particularly in recent years, as changes in 
government policy and funders' expectations have compelled charities 
to turn more aggressively toward the marketplace. 
In Part III of this Article, we will address briefly the question of 
what is to be done: whether there is a sensible way out of our present 
fix in which charities are compelled by government policy and societal 
preference to become entrepreneurial and self-supporting, but are 
arbitrarily penalized by the law for doing so. The discussion below 
does not offer a fully formed statutory scheme, but rather a broad 
suggestion for appropriate reform formulated in light of American 
charity's complicated history and present legal fix. 
314. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,682 (Nov. 17, 1971). 
315. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 511. 
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A. A Reformed Legal Definition of Charity 
American charity laws are confused and confusing because of the 
inconsistent cultural and legal definition of charity itself. Why not 
then alter the definition of charity, at least for purposes of federal tax 
law, in a way that both honors and clarifies our divergent traditions? 
Let us create a new subcategory of charitable organizations-call 
them vulgar charities-whose missions and resources are devoted 
exclusively to serving the poor. We must leave as a matter for debate 
and statutory drafting exactly which organizations will qualify for this 
designation and which will not, but we can begin here by sketching the 
broad outlines. 
Most organizations that today obtain tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3) as "public benefit organizations" will not qualify as vulgar 
charities. Thus, health care organizations and educational institutions 
that serve the general public and do not focus on the poor will not 
qualify. Nor will arts programs geared toward the general public, 
middle- and upper-class neighborhood associations, garden societies, 
symphony orchestras, the Boy or Girl Scouts of America, or YMCAs 
that cater to fitness buffs in upscale communities. 
The category of vulgar charities would include the panoply of 
organizations whose missions involve serving the poor. Job training 
programs, community economic development and low-cost housing 
organizations that focus on disadvantaged neighborhoods, boys' and 
girls' clubs in low-income communities, no-cost and low-cost 
community-based health clinics, organizations that serve poor artisans 
from developing countries, and of course soup kitchens all would 
qualify.316 In effect, the new category would group together those 
organizations that judges and administrators long have been 
intuitively grouping together and protecting by finding reasons to give 
them a "pass" under incoherent legal doctrines such as commerciality. 
Concrete advantages would accrue to those charitable organizations 
deemed vulgar. The vagaries of contemporary tax law doctrines 
316. Formulating the precise contours of the new legal category will prove 
challenging. Defining "poor" is relatively straightforward: Regulations already exist 
that define poverty as a percentage of median income. Such definitions are 
frequently relied upon by, among others, organizations that develop low-income 
housing. A more difficult policy question would arise as to whether the new legal 
category should include not only the poor but also the "distressed." If this new 
category is to remain consonant with history, any broadening of the category of 
"distressed" would have to be confined to people who are incapable of helping 
themselves. Thus, an organization such as the Betty Ford clinic that helps wealthy 
addicts face their addictions would not qualify, because their clients typically can 
afford to pay for high-priced treatment. On the other hand, a drug rehabilitation 
facility aimed at low- and moderate-income individuals-those who typically could 
not afford to pay for such services-might qualify. Similarly, elder-care organizations 
geared toward the well-off would not qualify as vulgar, while those dedicated to 
caring for low- and moderate-income individuals could. 
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would disappear, and they would be governed by the perm1ss1ve 
destination-of-income test that was launched in the wake of the 
Trinidad opinion and later squelched by the commerciality doctrine 
and UBIT.317 Those charities devoted to serving the poor would be 
given broad latitude to earn income to support their missions in 
whatever way they decide. Traditional charities could launch fee-
generating enterprises related to their charitable missions (which, 
under existing federal law they should be able to do anyway, 
notwithstanding the commerciality doctrine ),318 but they also could 
choose to launch unrelated businesses to cross-subsidize their 
charitable work. Such organizations would continue to answer to 
regulators under intermediate sanctions,319 the private inurement 
doctrine,320 and the operational test321 to ensure that the profits 
generated by their enterprises were in fact going to serve the poor; 
however, these charities would no longer live under the vague and 
confusing specter of commerciality, UBIT, and commensurate-in-
scope.322 
This refined definition of charity would have several salutary 
effects. First, it would create a more consistent and predictable legal 
framework in which vulgar charities could plan and carry out their 
missions. Rather than struggling with a legal regime in which judges 
and administrators make ad hoc decisions regarding charitable status, 
twisting the law to satisfy their and society's intuitive sense that there 
ought to be a special place for charity directed toward the poor, the 
new definition would create a legally recognized and favored category 
so that they (the judges) and we (society) could do it explicitly and 
consistently. This new legal category would acknowledge that the 
work of serving the poor needs to be done ( even if only by creating 
the conditions under which the poor and distressed can help 
themselves), that few are willing to pay for it with their tax dollars, 
that charities are being forced to embrace entrepreneurial solutions to 
pay their own way, and that it is simply wrong to insist that charities 
adopt the methods and ethos of commerce while at the same time 
punishing them for doing so. 
Such a reform also would be consonant with our multifarious 
history of charity. Instead of chafing against history, this reform 
would embrace it and allow it to strengthen our law. This new 
317. See supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text. 
318. See supra Part 11.C.2. 
319. See I.RC§ 4958 (2000). 
320. See Treas. Reg.§ l.501(a)-l(c) (as amended in 1982). 
321. See Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c) (as amended in 1990). 
322. Other commentators have advocated simplifying or eliminating aspects of the 
operational test. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 183, at 549 (suggesting reforming the 
operational test to include a bright line measure of charitability by examining 
charities' gross expenditures and comparing related and unrelated activity); Pena & 
Reid, supra note 176, at 1863 (same). 
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definition would acknowledge that, in spite of the passage of five 
hundred years since the Church of England began to pull charity from 
its Judeo-Christian roots, the ancient tradition of charity as succor to 
the poor persists as an important cultural value. At the same time, the 
proposed reform would leave in place the broader, common law 
definition of charity provided by the Statute of Charitable Uses,323 
Lord McNaughten's case,324 and, since the IRS administratively 
revised American law in the early 1950s,325 the Federal Internal 
Revenue Code.326 The category of "non-vulgar charities" would 
include everything that today qualifies under section 501(c)(3), minus 
the vulgar charities, which would enjoy their own more privileged 
category. 
Finally, the reform would acknowledge the role that work and 
commerce play in the realm of American charity. It would take 
account of the historical truth that, since the earliest Anglo-American 
charity laws, our society and legal system have considered commercial 
enterprise an acceptable, even laudable tool for addressing the needs 
of the poor, though not necessarily of serving the public benefit. 
Likewise, it would acknowledge that in recent years the phenomenon 
of adopting commerce as a tool for achieving charitable ends has 
moved, for better or worse, to the center of American charity. 
This definitional reform, proposed here in broad outline, would add 
clarity and consistency to American law by bringing our legal system 
into closer conformity with our society's historic and contemporary 
323. See supra notes 75-76. 
324. See supra note 77. 
325. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
326. Those organizations that qualify under today's standards for section 501(c)(3) 
tax exemption but do not qualify under the proposed category of "traditional 
charities" would continue to live under the rules they live by today, although those 
rules also could benefit from substantial reform. The notorious commerciality 
doctrine would be a good place to begin. Although an ideal course of action would be 
to entirely scrap commerciality, it is difficult to see how that could be accomplished 
elegantly after more than fifty years of case law. An acceptable alternative would be 
to ask Congress to codify the doctrine, making it clear that although commerciality 
(along with UBIT) was developed to prevent charities from unfairly competing with 
for-profit enterprises, that reasoning was flawed and should no longer be even 
nominally part of the legal analysis. Second, a codification of the commerciality 
doctrine should make clear that it does not exist to ensnare legitimate charities that 
generate income-even significant amounts of income-from commercial activities 
that are related to, and in furtherance of, their charitable missions. Finally, a 
codification and improvement of commerciality would make clear that it is rooted 
firmly within the IRS's operational test, rather than being a free-floating doctrine to 
be used at the whim of judges and administrators. As such, the commerciality 
doctrine's sole function would be to police the boundary between permissible 
unrelated income-generating activity subject to UBIT, and impermissible unrelated 
income-generating activity that jeopardized the organization's exemption. In other 
words, the commerciality doctrine would become the means by which judges and 
administrators would decide whether commercial activity had become the 
organization's primary purpose. 
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conception of charity. It would satisfy our society's obligation to 
provide for the poor, even if only by permitting the poor to provide 
for themselves without interference. Perhaps most important, it 
would solve a knotty legal problem by eliminating judges' intuitive 
need to invent or twist doctrines to winnow inappropriately 
commercial charities from the rest. 
B. Objections to the Proposed Reforms: Unfair Competition, Tax 
Base Erosion, Loss of Halo Effect 
Altering the legal definition of charity would not be a simple 
process. In addition to the challenge of drafting a workable definition 
of vulgar charity,327 any reform that has the effect of permitting 
charities to engage more freely in commercial activity will meet with 
strenuous objection, mostly from outside the world of charity. Three 
objections merit special attention. 
1. Unfair Competition 
If recent history is a guide, the earliest and loudest objections will 
come from for-profit businesses.328 Since the Trinidad case launched 
the era of nonprofit "feeder" corporations,329 business interests have 
protested what they claim is unfair competition coming from 
nonprofit charities that engage in commerce.330 This alleged 
unfairness was a prime justification leading to the passage of UBIT in 
1950.331 Then as now,332 the for-profit business community's 
objections focus on two nonprofit tendencies that it deems unfair. 
First, for-profits claim that charitable, tax-exempt businesses engage 
in predatory pricing, using their comparative advantage-a lighter tax 
burden- to unfairly lower their prices and steal clients from for-profit 
firms. 333 The second, related, objection is that nonprofit charitable 
organizations, which enjoy comparatively large profit margins due to 
their tax-advantaged status, plough those marginal profits into market 
expansion, aiming to squeeze out for-profit businesses.334 
327. See supra note 316. 
328. See Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Unfair Competition With 
Small Business (1986); Hansmann, supra note 287, at 605. 
329. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
330. See Revenue Revision, supra note 287; see also Colombo, supra note 183, at 
529. 
331. See S. Rep. No. 85-2375, at 28-29 (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 85-2319, at 36-37 
(1950); see also Columbo, supra note 183, at 529. 
332. See Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 98-99 (1987) 
(statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business 
Administration). 
333. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 529-31. 
334. See id. 
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Although Congress seems to have found these claims of unfair 
competition persuasive,335 commentators have not. There is seeming 
unanimity among legal academics and economists who have wrestled 
with the unfairness issue that although competition from non-profit 
enterprises may be unwanted by for-profit businesses, it is not 
unfair.336 In lay terms, they found that the goal of nonprofit managers 
who engage in commercial activity is to produce revenue to subsidize 
their charitable missions. Because their goal-just like for-profit 
businesses-is to maximize revenue, they have no motivation to 
charge anything lower than what the market will bear. There simply is 
no theoretical or empirical basis for the claim of price gouging.337 
Similarly, studies find no empirical evidence to support claims of 
unfair, subsidized market expansion. They suggest that charitable 
managers, rather than scheming to undercut for-profit competition, 
expand market share and force for-profit operators out of business, do 
exactly what we would hope they would do: They maximize their 
profits and devote them to serving their charitable missions.338 
There is also a broader policy argument that undercuts for-profit 
business' objections to entrepreneurial charities. It is the same 
argument we have mentioned above and will mention below: It 
simply is not fair for our society to tell charities that they must fend 
for themselves by competing in the market, and at the same time force 
them to compete wearing the shackles of the charity law doctrines. 
It may well be true that policy decisions taken since the Reagan era 
to shift the cost of caring for the poor away from government and 
toward the free market have placed a disproportionate share of that 
burden on owners of for-profit businesses that supply goods and 
services to the general public. As discussed above, they will not face 
unfair competition as a result of this shift, but they may face more 
competition. If we as a society find this burden shifting unacceptable, 
335. It is difficult to judge the precise degree to which Congress was persuaded. 
Although the legislative history accompanying UBIT states clearly that unfair 
competition was a prime motivation behind its passage, the legislation as passed 
focused the inquiry on whether or not the activity at issue was related to the 
organization's charitable mission. Competition with for-profit firms is not, and never 
has been, included as part of the legal analysis. See I.RC.§ 513(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.513-l(a) (as amended in 1983). 
336. Colombo, supra note 183, at 530; see Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, 
The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale 
L.J. 299, 318-25 (1976); William A Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 
UCLA L. Rev. 13, 61-68 (1972) (arguing that Congress's passage of UBIT was a 
response to the "paranoid delusion" of unfair competition); Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (1982). 
337. See Hansmann, supra note 287, at 610-12. 
338. See Burton A Weisbrod, Modeling the Nonprofit Organization as a 
Multiproduct Firm: A Framework for Choice, in To Profit or Not to Profit, supra note 
192, at 47. It should not be forgotten that legal doctrines exist-intermediate 
sanctions, private inurement, the operational test-to identify and punish 
organizations that act as nonprofits in disguise. 
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we can debate whether to shift it back to the government or to some 
other sector of society. Until and unless that happens, we should not 
be persuaded by arguments that, in essence, complain that nonprofits 
are sometimes beating for-profit enterprises at their own game. 
2. Tax Base Erosion 
In 1993, a series of investigative articles ran in the Philadelphia 
Inquirer documenting waste, fraud, and abuse in the nonprofit sector. 
Among other condemning facts, the authors reported that the 
nonprofit sector's activities cost the country over $36 billion per year 
in lost revenue due to the tax-exempt status of nonprofit 
organizations.339 When regulation of the nonprofit sector is debated in 
Congress, tax base erosion is always high on the list of concerns.340 
It is not only lawmakers who worry about broad tax exemptions for 
charities. Economists and lawyers have put forward arguments to 
demonstrate that subsidizing charitable activity through tax 
exemption is an economically inefficient means of accomplishing 
socially necessary ends. They suggest that we as a people would spend 
our money more wisely if we directly subsidized socially necessary and 
useful charitable activities.341 It is beyond my ken and beyond the 
scope of this Article to grapple with those economic efficiency 
arguments, but it may also be unnecessary. 
A debate over economic inefficiency is unnecessary because if we as 
a society have formed a political consensus on any issue in recent 
decades, it is that we prefer not to provide social services through the 
mediating influence of the government.342 We prefer that the work of 
aiding the poor and distressed pay for itself, and to the extent it 
cannot and government must step into the fray with funding, we 
prefer to furnish that funding directly to consumers and let service 
providers compete against one another in the market for those scarce 
funds.343 
Having made the choice as a matter of policy and politics that we 
would not directly subsidize charitable work but would indirectly 
support its socially beneficial work by exempting it from taxation, it 
simply is not acceptable to critique the system as eroding the tax base. 
339. Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski, Nonprofits: America's Growth 
Industry, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 18, 1993, at 1 (the first in a series of articles presented 
under the title Warehouses of Wealth, beginning April 18, 1993 and continuing 
through April 23, 1993). 
340. See Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 98-99 (1987); 
Revenue Revision, supra note 287; S. Rep. No. 85-2375, at 28-29 (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 
85-2319, at 36-37 (1950). 
341. See generally Colombo, supra note 183, at 538-44. 
342. See supra Part 11.C. 
343. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
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The work of supporting and providing for the poor and distressed, and 
the work of accomplishing social benefits not provided by the market, 
is expensive. We can pay for it through direct subsidies. We can pay 
for it by the indirect subsidy of a tax exemption. But what we cannot 
do, or at least should not do, is decide to keep charities alive through 
indirect subsidy of tax exemption, and then complain that the indirect 
subsidy is overly burdensome. 
3. Loss of the Halo 
Arguments attacking broad charitable tax exemptions on grounds 
of unfair competition and tax base erosion generally come from 
outside the world of charity. However, the proposed notion of taking 
the fetters off of vulgar charities and permitting them to raise 
operating funds in whatever commercial manner they please would 
also face criticism from within the world of charity. 
The critique from within harkens back to charity's pre-Reformation 
roots described in Part I.Al of this Article. In essence, it is that the 
charitable sector has always acted and should continue to act as a 
guardian of values in our society.344 Charity plays a vital role in our 
culture because people trust it: They trust that charitable 
organizations are motivated by love and compassion, not by desire for 
lucre.345 If we permit charitable organizations to engage in unfettered 
commercial activity, the argument goes, the boundaries that exist 
between the worlds of charity and for-profit businesses will fade. 346 
Inevitably, commercial activity will displace charity's core values of 
compassion and love, and society will cease to view the sector as a 
special guardian of our cherished values.347 Once this happens, people 
will no longer be willing to donate their hard-earned money to 
charities, and, eventually, will be unwilling to support tax exemptions 
to enable their work. 
Responses are varied. Evelyn Brody and others have produced a 
body of work arguing that the sectoral boundaries between for-profit 
and charity are largely illusory, and that rational public policy should 
move toward funding socially beneficial work regardless of whether it 
springs from the commercial or charitable sector.348 Others have 
344. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text; see also The Resilient Sector, 
supra note 158, at 11. 
345. See Clotfelter & Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 511; Janne G. Gallagher, Peddling 
Products: The Need to Limit Commercial Behavior by Nonprofit Organizations, 12 
Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 1007, 1014 (1995). 
346. C!otfelter & Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 511. 
347. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 534 (referring to the "diversion problem" 
argument, by which the attention of charity managers is diverted from core charitable 
missions to commercial activity). 
348. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergences of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457,461, 535-
36 (1996). 
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produced empirical research to indicate that charity managers are in 
fact able to continue to focus on their core charitable missions while 
raising money through commercial enterprise.349 Thus, it may be 
possible for charity to continue to wear its halo and maintain its 
trusted status even if it does continue to turn toward the market. 
Ultimately, however, the response to this critique is that the horse is 
out of the barn. As described in detail in Part I of this Article, for 
hundreds of years Anglo-American charity has embraced work and 
commerce as vital tools for achieving charitable ends, and recent 
American history has pushed charity decisively toward the market. 
This insistence on entrepreneurship and profit-making among 
charities may prove to be a positive development or a negative 
development, but it is a development that seems bound to continue, 
and charities and the rest of society must acknowledge that fact and 
make adjustments in our law to fit the reality we have created. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that we in the United States, particularly 
those of us who pay attention to our laws and legal system, should not 
continue to do what we are doing: We should not as a society 
continue to push charitable organizations toward the free market and 
the ideal of financial self-support while permitting our legal system to 
threaten them and punish them for doing so. 
Before drawing the discussion to a close, it is important to run 
through a few conclusions for which this Article does not stand. First, 
although it suggests creating a new category of vulgar charities, this 
Article should not be read as supporting the proposition that we in 
America would be better off hewing more closely and exclusively to a 
spiritually infused, compassion-based version of charity. There are 
compelling arguments to the contrary: That such charity is inevitably 
donor-focused; that it tends to be condescending and rob initiative 
from the people it purports to serve; and that it takes the fight out of 
young idealists from the wealthier classes, who come to believe that 
spooning soup at the local homeless shelter is the most powerful, if 
not the only, action they can take to affect the plight of the poor and 
distressed.350 This Article only makes the point that such charity is an 
enduring part of our culture. It has not disappeared in the centuries 
since the English Reformation, it is unlikely to disappear in the near 
future, and therefore American charity law should take account of it. 
Similarly, this Article should not be read as supporting the policies 
that were launched during the Reagan administration and maintained 
in one form or another through subsequent administrations that, at 
least rhetorically, left the work of supporting the poor and distressed 
349. See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 192, at 47-64. 
350. See generally Wagner, supra note 6, at 173-74. 
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to well-meaning volunteers.351 Person-to-person, voluntary charity 
can accomplish good work on behalf of those in need, and it is at the 
heart of those communitarian values that remain in our society, but it 
is not and never will be sufficient to serve the legitimate needs of 
those at the bottom who are searching for ladders or the materials to 
build their own.352 
Finally, although in this Article I describe the increasing 
commercialization of American charity and argue that our law should 
adapt to accommodate the trend, I do not intend to take the position 
that this increasing commercialization of charity is an entirely 
laudable trend. Good may come from it. Infusing charity with a spirit 
of entrepreneurship opens up exciting possibilities for people of 
limited wealth and power to take charge of their futures and improve 
their own lots. Because self-supporting charities receive less financial 
input from government and philanthropy, they are less beholden to 
those actors' priorities and better able to develop strategies and 
programs that appropriately serve their stakeholders' needs. 
However, I share concerns, described in Part 11.B.3 above, about 
losing public trust for the charitable sector. There is something more 
than sentimental longing in the claim that charity creates a space 
within our society where the cooperative instincts hardwired within us 
are honored and supported. Along with the judges and administrators 
whose legal rulings I criticized above, I carry within me an instinctual 
sense that we as a society ought to maintain a sector in which values of 
compassion, love, and communitarian spirit are paramount, a sector 
that society can trust to focus on the needs of the least of us rather 
than on generating profits. 
What this Article does stand for is one fairly narrow proposition: 
We should act now to eliminate the legal double bind that we have 
created for contemporary American charities. If we take it as a given 
that society in general and our government and philanthropic 
community in particular will continue to expect charities to be 
entrepreneurial and self-supporting, then we should not allow our 
legal system to threaten and to penalize them when they comply with 
those dictates. I have proposed one way out of this double bind of 
creating the category of vulgar charity. It would call on us to 
acknowledge that Anglo-American history has left us with a split 
definition of charity. It would further require acknowledging that our 
culture and our law long ago began to insist upon work and enterprise 
351. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. Each administration has 
couched this desire to return to vulgar, compassionate charity in different rhetorical 
guises. The phrase described George H.W. Bush's yearning for vulgar charity as 
"points of light." The Clinton administration combined the spirit of volunteerism 
with government funding and private sector methodologies under the rubric of 
AmeriCorps. George W. Bush added a more evangelical twist to his administration's 
push for vulgar charity with his Faith Based Initiative. 
352. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 165-68. 
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as means of accomplishing charitable ends. Next, it would require us 
to acknowledge that judges and administrative authorities have 
repeatedly shown that they are comfortable permitting charities to 
engage in commercial enterprise, so long as the resulting profits serve 
vulgar, not merely public-benefit, charitable purposes, even though 
there is no clear legal doctrine that permits them to draw this 
distinction. Finally, it would mean surrendering to this tension by 
creating a new legal category of vulgar charities that would permit 
charities working on behalf of the poor to engage openly in 
commerce, and would free courts and administrators to focus on 
charitable organizations that fall into the more general public-benefit 
classification. 
